Amit Dua October 29, 2019
Huawei is working on its next-generation mid-range smartphone dubbed Huawei Nova 6 under its popular Nova lineup. As the name suggests, the smartphone is going to be a successor of previously launched Nova 5. We are already aware of the fact that the device will come in 4G as well as 5G connectivity. For those who’re unaware, the Nova 6 5G variant recently leaked revealing the pill-shaped front camera design. The smartphone has yet again appeared on the rumour mill and this time it has managed to get the 3C certification.
Huawei Nova 6 to come with 40W Fast Charging Support
According to the emerging report, the Nova 6 recently appeared on the 3C certification listing with the model number WLZ-AL10. This the 4G variant which has bagged the certification as of now. For the 5G variant, the device comes with the model number WLZ-AN00. The 3C listing reveals a very key aspect of the device. The smartphone is seen featuring an HW-100400c00 charger which offers up to 40W fast charging speed.
Sadly, the listing doesn’t reveal any hardware specifications of the device. To recall, both the variants of the device have already received the TENAA certification. Furthermore, Huawei devices with model number WLZ-AL10, WLZ-AN00, WLZ-L29, WLZ-LX2, and a few others have recently been approved by the Bluetooth SIG body. We’re expecting the 5G variant of the smartphone to run on the latest Kirin 990 5G-enabled chipset.
As per the previous leaks and rumours, Huawei Nova 6 will feature an AMOLED display with an in-display fingerprint sensor. The smartphone will feature a glass sandwich design with gradient finish at the back. We will also see a quad-camera module on the back accompanied by an LED flash and laser autofocus.
At the time of covering this, there is no solid information on the pricing and launch details of the device. Since the smartphone has now appeared on the 3C listing, the official unveiling should be much sooner than we think. If that’s the case, then we might see more details coming forward in the coming weeks. Various rumours also point towards the December launch later this year.
Source: gizchina “Huawei Nova 6 Surfaces in 3C Certification, Features 40W Fast Charging”
Note: This is gizchina’s report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
30 October 2019 17:18 Gordon Mathews
An extraordinary event happened in Chungking Mansions last Saturday. Well over a thousand Hong Kong Chinese people came to the building and participated in free tours conducted by ethnic minority social workers; most also stayed for dinner, causing long good-natured lines of prospective diners to form, waiting for their turn to sample Chungking Mansions’ ethnic cuisines. South Asian shopkeepers in the building who recently had been lamenting their declining business marvelled at the massive influx of young Hongkongers. “I have never seen anything like this in my entire life!” one exclaimed to me.
This event came about because Jimmy Sham, the convenor of the Civil Human Rights Front – who are the major organiser of the recent protests – was beaten up on October 16 by several men identified as South Asian. Concerns over a backlash against South Asians arose, particularly in Chungking Mansions. To forestall ethnic resentment, Jeffrey Andrews, a prominent social worker at the Chungking Mansions-based NGO Christian Action Centre for Refugees, organised various ethnic minority members to hand out water and food to protesters on October 20. (Ironically that day, it was the Hong Kong police, shooting their water cannon at the Kowloon Mosque, who alienated many among Hong Kong’s ethnic minorities, leading to a public apology by Chief Executive Carrie Lam.)
Following this, Andrews, together with Jonnet Kudera of the Christian Action Centre for Refugees, organised the October 25 event. Young Hong Kong participants admired the elaborate Indian Diwali celebration displays in Chungking Mansions, sampled Indian sweets, marvelled at the cultural diversity they beheld, and also occasionally broke into chants: “five demands, not one less!”
This was an amazing happening. Chungking Mansions – long seen as a place to be feared by many in Hong Kong as the home of “ethnic otherness” – was celebrated and cherished by young Hongkongers on this day, as had never before occurred. I myself was at this event, and was overwhelmed with joy. And yet, I am concerned that this event does not fully depict a diminishment of Hong Kong racism, but rather a shift. A shift in Hong Kong’s “ethnic other.”
South Asians and Africans are no longer that “ethnic other”; instead it is the mainland Chinese.
I have taught a weekly class of refugees in Chungking Mansions for the past thirteen years. My African and South Asian students in years past would regularly recount the racism they experienced in their daily lives in Hong Kong, with, for example, Hongkongers refusing to sit next to them on public transport, and occasionally cursing at them. In recent years, however, the situation has been changing. As one African refugee said, “Hong Kong students used to ask, ‘Why do you people come here?’ in an unfriendly way. Now, over the past few years, they really want to talk with you!”
As another African refugee told me, “It used to be, a few years ago, when I stepped onto a basketball court in Hong Kong, all the [Hong Kong Chinese] people would leave. Now they all want to play basketball with me, and even invite me to dinner.”
This change in attitude was reflected in a remarkable incident last year. Several Hong Kong localists were attending the class. A South Asian refugee asked a localist, “Can I be a Hongkonger?” He was told, “of course you can be a Hongkonger! We need people like you here!” An African refugee asked, “Can I be a Hongkonger?” and was told, “of course you can be a Hongkonger! We need people like you here!” Then a mainland Chinese student, also attending the class, asked, “Can I be a Hongkonger?” and was told, “Well…” The answer was apparently no.
The government of Hong Kong has of course been continuously emphasising Hong Kong’s Chineseness. In opposition to this, the attitude of these localists was that of Hong Kong as “anything but Chinese.” This attitude is that in order to preserve Hong Kong’s distinctiveness as against mainland China, it must be international- unlike mainland China – and it must maintain its complete distinctiveness from mainland China.
While the refugees I know, as well as other members of minority ethnicities in Hong Kong, generally report a far higher degree of acceptance and welcoming among Hong Kong young people than among their elders, many of the mainland Chinese students I know report a very different situation. Some of the mainland students have been terrified to leave the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) campus; several have reported being harassed when they speak Putonghua on the street in Hong Kong. The destruction by protesters of mainland-linked stores in Hong Kong furthers these students’ sense of fear and alienation from Hong Kong: “Hong Kong hates people like me!” a mainland student exclaimed, in a comment repeated in various ways by a number of the mainland students I know and teach in Hong Kong.
Protesters I know say, “we don’t hate Chinese people, we hate the Chinese government and the Communist Party.” This is no doubt true; but of course since it is the government that educates mainland Chinese people such as my students, it can seem difficult to separate government and people. As chair of the Department of Anthropology at CUHK, I have been trying to arrange dialogues between mainland students and Hong Kong students, with some initial success thus far. But it is a hard process because attitudes towards the Hong Kong protests can be so different among members of the two groups, and mutual understanding can be extremely difficult to arrive at. Still, it seems essential to try.
The October 25 event in Chungking Mansions was an amazing event, but it did not mark an end to Hong Kong “racism.” Hong Kong racism can only end when everybody – regardless of ethnic or national background – is welcomed. This may be difficult given the current conflict, and the vast differences in interpretation among people of different backgrounds (and I must add, I am in complete agreement with the protesters’ aim of preserving Hong Kong’s freedoms, although I abhor violence). But Hong Kong “racism” will truly end only when everyone, regardless of background or nationality, can be welcomed and respectfully argued with, rather than disdained. I am cautiously optimistic, in this time of dark turmoil and police brutality, that this day will eventually come in Hong Kong. But it hasn’t come yet.
Source: hongkongfp.com “South Asians and Africans are no longer Hong Kong’s ‘ethnic other’ – now it’s the mainland Chinese”
Note: This is hongkongfp.com’s report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
SCMP says in its article “Tough US immigration policy could be the key to China winning technology race, says top AI investor” that US crackdown on Chinese and Chinese-American reserachers benefits China’s development of technology, especially artificial intelligence.
It quotes Ning Tao, president and partner of Sinovation Ventures, one of China’s leading venture capital businesses with a focus on AI, “While the US is driving talent away, it is the perfect time for us to race to bring them back to China. This talent would be the key asset in fuelling China’s rise in the field.”
In the 1950’s US racial discrimination against Chinese talent drove about 50 top Chinese scientists and engineers back to China, who have helped developed among other things, atomic bombs, missiles and satellite. The US is now repeating its folly again.
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on SCMP’s article, full text of which can be viewed at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3035546/tough-us-immigration-policy-could-be-key-china-winning.
October 29, 2019 / 6:47 PM / Updated 3 hours ago
BEIJING (Reuters) – China will eliminate all restrictions on foreign investments not included in its self-styled “negative lists,” a vice commerce minister said on Tuesday, and also will “neither explicitly nor implicitly” force foreign investors and companies to transfer technologies.
The statement to a news conference in Beijing by Wang Shouwen signalled possible upcoming directives.
Technology transfers have been a major source of tension between China and the United States, which have been embroiled in a trade war for over a year.
The ‘negative lists’ specify industries in which investors, foreign or domestic, are restricted or prohibited.
“We will move faster to open up the financial industry,” said Wang, eliminating all restrictions on the scope of business for foreign banks, securities companies and fund managers.
Policies will also be fine-tuned to ensure foreign and domestic players have equal market access to manufacturing new-energy vehicles, he said.
The new measures are intended to ensure stable foreign investment and create a transparent, predictable investment environment, Wang said.
The U.S.-China Business Council said forced technology transfer requirements and investment restrictions that required joint ventures were a concern for many of its more than 200 member companies.
“We are encouraged by the vice minister’s statement on eliminating forced technology transfer requirements in the China market,” said Jake Parker, the group’s senior vice president. “We look forward to these new liberalizations quickly resulting in transparent regulatory reviews that lead to licenses granted after narrowly defined review timelines.”
Chief U.S. and Chinese trade negotiators talked on the phone recently and will speak again soon, Geng Shuang, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, told a separate news conference. He did not give a timeframe.
U.S. President Donald Trump agreed this month to cancel an Oct. 15 hike in tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese goods as part of a tentative agreement on agricultural purchases, increased access to China’s financial services markets, better protections for intellectual property rights and a currency pact.
Leaders of the world’s two biggest economies are working to agree on the text for a “Phase one” trade agreement announced by Trump on Oct. 11.
Trump has said he hopes to sign the deal with China’s President Xi Jinping next month at a summit in Chile, but a U.S. administration official said on Tuesday the text of the deal might not be completed in time.
White House spokesman Judd Deere said both sides were still working to complete work on the interim deal.
Reporting by Huizhong Wu and Ben Blanchard; additional reporting by Andrea Shalal in Washington; Writing by Gabriel Crossley and Andrea Shalal; editing by John Stonestreet and Dan Grebler
Source: Reuters “China to ease foreign investments curbs, won’t force tech transfers -vice minister”
Note: This is Reuters’ report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
CGTN says in its article “Trade deal tops agenda at upcoming ASEAN summit” that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will be signed at ASEAN summit November 2-4.
“Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Moon Jae-in are confirmed to attend as senior figures from ASEAN’s dialogue-partner nations,” CGTN says.
“The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a planned agreement between the 10 countries of ASEAN and six more nations: China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The bloc accounts for half the world’s population and a third of global trade.”
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on CGTN’s report, full text of which can be viewed at https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-10-28/RCEP-tops-agenda-at-upcoming-ASEAN-summit-LajwwXScDu/index.html.
Defenses build under the waves.
by Lyle J. Goldstein October 27, 2019
Key point: Sea mines have a strong history of imperiling adversarial navies.
As defense analysts brood over the evolving military balance in the western Pacific, considerations related to undersea warfare keep coming to the fore. Given the lethality of modern anti-ship cruise missiles, surface combatants of all types may well be scarce on the future naval battlefield. Moreover, precision strikes on airbases (and the inherent vulnerability of aircraft carriers) suggest that aerial platforms could additionally be rather sparse during the first few critical weeks of any military conflict that breaks out in the Asia-Pacific region. That leaves submarines (assisted by undersea robots) to decide the epic battle.
Western strategists have been reasonably comfortable with this conclusion, safe in the knowledge that Washington possesses a very considerable undersea advantage over Beijing. That advantage includes acoustic superiority, larger and more capable boats, and a wealth of experience both in operating submarines and in developing undersea warfare-technology innovations. However, this column has occasionally drawn attention to caveats in the assumption of U.S. undersea superiority, including China’s robust mine-warfare posture, its broad front effort to improve its antisubmarine capabilities, as well as possible attempts to experiment with alternative submarine doctrines. That is not to even mention the fact that the U.S. Navy fleet of nuclear attack submarines is now declining to a perilous low of just forty-one boats by 2029—a “valley” in U.S. naval capabilities that is widely noted in Chinese military sources.
This edition of Dragon Eye seeks to sketch out the undersea warfare competition in the western Pacific in slightly greater detail, by discussing a new Chinese-language article about China’s new “undersea Great Wall” (水下长城) that appeared in a late 2015 edition of China Ocean News (中国海洋报). The article presents a rather complete discussion of China’s new “undersea monitoring system” (水下观测系统). Making clear the national-security imperative for developing this system, the article begins with the suggestion that China’s maritime security situation has become “significantly complicated.” In particular, it is pointed out that in the undersea domain, China’s “doors have been left wide open” (门户洞开). China’s methods for tracking undersea targets are said to have been “weak.”
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that the article does not rely on the military rationale alone to justify this ambitious research and development enterprise. A paragraph is devoted to the many nonmilitary applications of such a system, that include providing advanced warning of natural disasters, such as typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis. Thus, the undersea monitoring system is explained as an important way to “reduce social and economic costs” to China’s massive coastal population. Another rationale offered for the system is that all the other major maritime powers are involved in similar research projects, including Canada, the United States, Japan and the European Union. These systems under development by other countries have civilian research objectives “and at the same time have military goals too” (同时用于军事目的).
According to this rendering, the undersea observation system is intended to rectify three lingering gaps. First, Beijing’s lack of ability to monitor targets in the undersea domain is not commensurate with its status as a great power. Nor is it commensurate with “the growing strategic threat” (战略威胁的增长严重). Finally, China’s longtime substandard capability for undersea observation is said to be out of sync with Beijing’s naval surface and subsurface combat capabilities.
This account relates that the first elements of a Chinese undersea observation system went into the water in 2010. Other reports I have analyzed suggest the initial setup was near China’s North Sea Fleet headquarters at Qingdao. A second installation occurred off of Hainan Island in 2011 and part of the system went into operation for testing in May 2013 near the Sanya nuclear submarine base. Two other projects were also mentioned, including one near Shanghai at Yangshan, as well as one managed by Zhejiang University at Zhairuoshan Island. The latter system was deployed in August 2013, according to this article.
It is emphatically stated, moreover, that China’s ambitions for its undersea observation system cannot be restricted to its coastal waters, but rather may be appropriate to deploy into all ocean areas touching Chinese national interests. Therefore, the systems may be put into place in “the near seas, the depths of the far seas, and around islands bordering the far seas, as well as in strategic passages and such areas” (对近海, 深远海, 边远海岛, 战略通道等区域). More than once in the article, the author compares this endeavor to a space project in terms of complexity and difficulty. Indeed, a definite concern is voiced in the article concerning poor coordination among different ministries, capabilities that are too decentralized, duplicative efforts and wasted resources. Notably, the author calls for developing a “strict system of secrecy” for the project.
The above developments should serve as a warning that Beijing is not simply willing to yield to American undersea dominance. The recent RAND “Scorecard” report on the evolving military balance in the western Pacific does actually attempt to model certain aspects of a hypothetical undersea-warfare battle. For example, an evaluation of U.S. submarines operating against a Chinese amphibious force invading Taiwan yields the conclusion that growing Chinese ASW forces might kill 1.82 U.S. submarines per week of the campaign (p. 213). If the campaign lasted two weeks, therefore, the U.S. Navy could presumably expect to lose approximately three to four submarines.
But this conclusion, entailing very significant U.S. losses, could actually be too rosy. Bathymetry (water depth) would mean very shallow and tight spaces for comparatively larger U.S. submarines. China could employ unconventional platforms like coast guard vessels or even fishing boats to patrol adversaries’ submarine operating areas and report on periscope sightings and missile launches. In creating such a low-tech ASW targeting system, the Chinese would know well that such nonmilitary vessels would not be worth the expenditure of even a single precious American torpedo since submarines are well known to have comparatively limited magazines, nor any easy solution for resupply.
What is most troubling about the RAND study is that it does not seriously grapple with the problem of sea mines and their likely employment against U.S. submarines. Ten of fifty-two U.S. submarines lost in the Pacific War were likely destroyed by sea mines. It is well known, moreover, that China has deployed and continues to work diligently on ASW-optimized sea mines. The undersea observation system discussed above presents yet another challenge to U.S. undersea superiority that did not figure into the RAND estimate of losses.
True, these waters may be so shallow and noisy as to limit the value of these new undersea sensors for Beijing. But Chinese scientists are hard at work trying to master the principles of shallow-water acoustics, and such breakthroughs cannot be ruled out.
Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government. This article first appeared several years ago.
Source: National Interest “China Is Building a “Undersea Great Wall” To Take on America in a War”
Note: This is National Interest’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
And that Beijing won’t always follow America’s plans for military dominance.
by Michael Peck October 27, 2019
Key point: Military capabilities are about more than size.
Is China’s newest aircraft carrier half-full or half-empty?
That depends on how you look at the vessel’s aircraft capacity.
The ship, prosaically named the Type 001A for now, is China’s second carrier and the first built in China. The first carrier, the Liaoning, is a refurbished ex-Soviet vessel.
The Liaoning could carry twenty-four J-15 fighters. The Type 001A can carry thirty-six J-15s plus various support aircraft and helicopters, according to Chinese media.
“Although the second carrier known as the Type 001A is similar to the Liaoning, it has an optimized flight deck, reduced weapon areas and a smaller superstructure with added deck areas,” a Chinese naval expert told China’s state-owned Global Times. “It also has an enlarged hanger, but reduced space for missile storage compared to the Liaoning.”
Interestingly, Global Times suggested that twenty-four J-15s on the Liaoning “could be a limit factor as a regional combat might require about 40 aircraft in order to seize air supremacy. The 36 fighter jets on the Type 001A would greatly expand its combat capability.”
But Global Times also noted that the United States “operates much larger aircraft carriers, including the Nimitz-class which can carry about 60 aircraft, while the country’s latest Ford-class can carry about 75.”
Where China’s inexperience with building and operating aircraft carriers is seen by critics as a drawback, Hu Wenming, chairman of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation and head of China’s aircraft carrier program, suggested that Chinese shipbuilders are both mature—and youthful—at the same time.
“China now has a mature development and construction team, and the average age of team members is only 36,” he said. “Whatever type of aircraft carrier our country wants to develop in the future, we can make it on our own,”
“It took only 26 months to build and launch the Type 001A, which is China’s first domestically developed aircraft carrier, almost half of the time for a foreign aircraft carrier of similar type to finish construction,” Chinese state-owned broadcaster CCTV added.
The Type 001A was launched in 2017, and has so far undergone six sea trials. Apparently, not all has gone smoothly, as the most recent tests suggested problems with the ship.
So how does the Type 001A rate as an aircraft carrier? The 65,000-ton vessel is dwarfed by a 100,000-ton U.S. Nimitz- or Ford-class carrier, which can carry almost double the aircraft of their Chinese counterparts. But the U.S. carriers are conventional World War II-style carriers that are essentially floating runways, with long flight decks in which aircraft are launched by catapult, and then return to make an abrupt arrested-wire landing.
The Type 001A is a Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL), or “ski-jump” carrier, with a sharply inclined bow for abbreviated takeoffs by aircraft that will then land vertically like a helicopter. Britain’s Queen Elizabeth-class uses the same approach: with the British flattops displacing about 65,000 tons and carrying about thirty-six F-35B STOVL aircraft, they’re equivalent to the Chinese carriers. Both classes are smaller and less capable than the American giants.
The problem with comparisons is that different nations need different aircraft carriers. The United States, accustomed to projecting power and prestige around the globe, relies on huge carriers that can sail to remote locations and launch a relatively large number of aircraft—a sixty-plane U.S. Navy carrier air wing is equivalent to about three or four U.S. Air Force squadrons.
China’s carrier fleet is still a work in progress. But the Type 001A will probably operate in the South China Sea or other waters not far from the Chinese mainland or island bases, where it would enjoy support from land-based aircraft or missiles. In that case, a Chinese carrier wouldn’t need to carry as many planes as an American vessel.
Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. This article first appeared earlier this year.
Source: Nationa Interest “China’s Mini Aircraft Carriers Mean Business”
Note: This is National Interest’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
Efe Udin October 25, 2019
As of now, South Korea is still leading the 5G market in terms of the number of active users. However, it appears that the Chinese market will be taking over pretty soon. According to media reports, Chinese operators will officially implement the 5G package on November 1. At today’s Beijing Mobile Industry Alliance Conference, Beijing Mobile executives revealed that on October 31. China’s 5G commercial launch ceremony will be held at the 2019 Beijing International Communication Exhibition. This launch is under the auspices of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
The details of China’s 5G package will be announced on October 31. Interestingly, China Unicom and China Telecom already have their 5G package appointments. At present, the number of appointments for the 5G packages of the three major operators in China is impressive. Currently, they collectively exceed 9.5 million, and the number of appointments is still increasing rapidly. The three major operators are vigorously promoting the 5G package.
The main advantage of 5G networks is that the data transmission rate is much higher than the previous cellular network. It can get up to 10Gbit/s, which is faster than the current wired Internet and 100 times faster than the previous 4G LTE cellular network. Another advantage is lower network latency which is less than 1 millisecond while 4G is 30-70 milliseconds. Due to faster data transmission, 5G networks will not only serve mobile phones but will also become a general home and office network provider. It will actively compete with cable network providers.
Source: gizchina.com “China’s 5G package will be officially implemented by operators from November 1”
Note: This is gizchina.com’s report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.