China has deployed a fleet of underwater drones in the Indian Ocean. According to Chinese government sources, the drones were launched in mid-December 2019 and recovered in February after making more than 3,400 observations. These Sea Wing gliders are a type of Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (UUV) which can operate for months on end.
The gliders are similar to ones deployed by the U.S. Navy. When China seized a U.S. Navy ocean glider in 2016 the stated reason was to ensure “safe navigation of passing ships.” Taken at face value, it may be surprising that China is now deploying these types of UUV en masse in the Indian Ocean. China has also deployed the Sea Wing from an ice breaker in the Arctic.
Reports from December 2019 suggested that 14 would be employed in the Indian Ocean mission. But newer reports suggest that only 12 were used. Possibly there were technical issues with the other two. They were launched by the specialist survey ship Xiangyanghong 06 which has since returned to Rizhou in China. The mission was the winter survey for the Joint Ocean and Ecology Research Project run by the Ministry of Natural Resources.
The Sea Wing (Haiyi) bear a striking resemblance to the Littoral Battlespace Sensing-Glider (LBS-G) used by the U.S. Navy. On December 15, 2016, China obtained a U.S. Navy LBS-G in international waters in the South China Sea. The glider was in the process of being recovered by USNS Bowditch when a small boat from a Chinese vessel which had been shadowing the Navy vessel plucked it from the water. After a diplomatic spat the glider was returned to a U.S. Navy warship.
The Sea Wing isn’t a case of reverse engineering however. It was reported in Chinese sources in September 2016, months before the U.S. Navy incident. But the American type is a clear influence and they are generally equivalent.
These gliders are unpowered. Instead they employ variable-buoyancy propulsion which makes them sink and then rise to the surface again. This is done by inflating and deflating a balloon-like device filled with pressurized oil. At the same time they have large wings so they can glide forward as they go. This allows them to run for extremely long periods of time, travelling vast distances. They are not fast or agile however, so a generally employed for long range missions where they can be left alone until they need to be picked up.
The Chinese gliders were reportedly gathering oceanography data. Sensors measured seawater temperature, salinity, turbidity, chlorophyll and oxygen levels. This information was transmitted back to the mother ship via the aerial in the tail. Although the aerial points directly backwards, it swings up above the surface as the glider noses down for another dive.
This is the sort of information which sounds innocuous but is commonly gathered for naval intelligence purposes. In particular it is relevant to submarine warfare. For example salinity levels can affect the distance that a submarine can be heard from. And it may be possible to detect submarines if they disturb chlorophyll.
For its part, China continues to report finding foreign UUVs off its coast. If Chinese fishing vessel catches a glider they are to hand it over to the government. Presumably the same fate did not befall any of the Chinese gliders.
Source: Forbes “China Deployed 12 Underwater Drones In Indian Ocean”
Note: This is Forbes’ article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
26 Mar 2020 10:51PM (Updated: 26 Mar 2020 11:25PM)
REUTERS: Senior cabinet officials in the Trump administration agreed to new measures to restrict the global supply of chips to China’s Huawei Technologies, sources familiar with the matter said, as the White House ramps up criticism of China over coronavirus.
Under the change, foreign companies that use U.S. chipmaking equipment would be required to obtain a U.S. license before supplying certain chips to Huawei. The Chinese telecoms company was blacklisted last year, limiting the company’s suppliers.
One of the sources said the rule-change is aimed at restricting the sale of sophisticated chips to Huawei and not older, more commoditized and widely-available semiconductors.
Because most chipmaking equipment used worldwide relies on American technology, the change would represent an expansion of export control authority that some trade experts have said would anger U.S. allies.
It is unclear if President Donald Trump, who appeared to push back against the proposal last month, will sign off on the rule change.
The decision came when U.S. officials from various agencies met and agreed on Wednesday to alter the Foreign Direct Product Rule, which subjects some foreign-made goods based on U.S. technology or software to U.S. regulations, the sources said.
The U.S. Department of Commerce, which would have a role in enacting any rule change, did not have an immediate comment.
(Reporting by Karen Freifeld in New York and David Shepardson in Washington. Additional reporting by Alexandra Alper and Mike Stone in Washington. Editing by Chris Sanders and Nick Zieminski)
Source: channelnewsasia.com “Exclusive: US nears rule-change to restrict Huawei’s global chip supply – sources”
Note: This is channelnewsasia.com’s’ report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
Huawei was on the front foot before the coronavirus crisis gripped China because of pressure from the US government
Pandemic has not slowed Ren’s commitment to develop own technology and remain world’s largest telco equipment supplier
Published: 6:00am, 26 Mar, 2020
Updated: 8:15pm, 26 Mar, 2020
While the coronavirus pandemic may have forced many companies in China and around the world to hit the pause button on business operations, engineers at Huawei Technologies have been working round the clock to combat the crisis.
The world’s largest telecommunications equipment supplier and China’s biggest smartphone maker has been motivated by a sense of mission, said Ren Zhengfei, founder and chief executive of Huawei, as he sat down for an interview with the South China Morning Post this week.
“Over 20,000 scientists, experts and engineers worked overtime during the Lunar New Year holiday, because we’re racing to develop new [technologies],” Ren said, referring to the work in progress as “something which will keep us ahead of global competition”, without revealing further details.
The company was on the front foot before the coronavirus crisis gripped China and spread around the world because of pressure from the US government on its market-leading 5G network gear business.
“The US will continue to increase sanctions on us, and we will have to complete [the new technologies] before that happens,” Ren, 75, said in a video interview from his Shenzhen office on Tuesday, the first he has given since the coronavirus outbreak shut down large parts of the world.
Aside from the US sanctions, Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer and Ren’s daughter by his first marriage, is still in Canada awaiting a hearing to be extradited to the US, where she faces a bank fraud charge. Ren said he misses his elder daughter, whom he last spoke with by phone in late January during the Lunar New Year holiday. Ren is confident that “there shouldn’t be a worst-case scenario” regarding Meng’s trial.
“I believe in the openness, fairness and justice of the Canadian legal system … the US intelligence has spent over a decade to find faults on our side and came up with no evidence today, which means we have been restrained in our own behaviours,” Ren said.
In May last year, Washington added Huawei and 68 of its non-US affiliates to a trade blacklist, officially called the Entity List, accusing the company of being a threat to national security, something which Huawei has repeatedly denied.
The action restricts Huawei’s ability to buy hardware, software and services from its American hi-tech suppliers without approval from the US government. This includes Google mobile services, used on its handsets for international markets, and key components in its next-generation mobile network base stations.
While the US has since granted five licence extensions to Huawei that allowed it temporary access to American suppliers, Trump earlier this month signed legislation to bar the country’s telecoms carriers from using US subsidies to purchase network equipment from Huawei.
The Trump administration has also continued to urge its allies in Europe to ditch Huawei in their 5G mobile network development plans.
“It’s not a problem for us to survive as a company, but it’s questionable whether we can keep our leading position,” Ren said. “We won’t be able to lead the world in the next three to five years if we cannot develop our own technology.”
Huawei will step up its investment in research and development, with the 2020 budget surpassing US$20 billion, up from US$15 billion last year, according to Ren.
However, Ren also noted that a complete de-Americanisation would be “impossible” for Huawei. “US firms will also need [Huawei as a client] to survive,” Ren said, adding that no one can be spared from the situation as a result of globalisation.
Huawei’s ambition to weather US sanctions, however, has been put under further pressure by the outbreak of Covid-19, which started to affect China in January. The viral disease has since spread around the world, forcing lockdown of communities and wreaking economic havoc.
It has morphed into a pandemic that has spread to 170 countries and regions, and as of Monday had forced more than one-fifth of the world’s population to stay in their homes.
Ren is confident that Huawei can pull through the crisis.
“Neither the US sanctions nor the pandemic had a major impact on us,” Ren said. “We believe the impact is minimal, and we can pull through it.”
Huawei has resumed more than 90 per cent of its production and development operations, Ren said, adding that the company has also kept its supply chain mostly intact by helping provide its partners with protective gear to keep production going.
Maintenance service personnel around the world have also been working to ensure that communications remain uninterrupted, Ren said. “The world needs internet service [even more] as the pandemic accelerated,” he said.
Other than Hubei, the province at the epicentre of the outbreak in China, none of the company’s global workforce has been infected by the coronavirus. Those who were afflicted in Hubei are now recovering, Ren said, without divulging numbers.
Although Europe, Huawei’s most lucrative market outside China, has now been gravely affected by Covid-19, Ren expects demand for its network gear there to remain strong on the back of peoples’ need for online services.
“New technologies such as tele-health, online learning and remote working have showed to the world their usefulness in preventing disease from spreading, as well as the importance of network connections,” Ren said. “Even when the West is feeling the mounting impact of the coronavirus, most of our projects can actually enhance their capabilities [during the outbreak]. There is a demand we need to meet.”
(Corrects in the sixth paragraph to say Meng faces bank fraud charge in the US)
Source: SCMP “Founder Ren Zhengfei says Huawei ‘racing to develop’ new technologies amid coronavirus pandemic”
Note: This is SCMP’s report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is having profound impacts on recipient countries. This paper examines the benefits and costs of the BRI and its projects to Sri Lanka and the lessons that may improve future BRI projects in Sri Lanka and elsewhere.
Executive Director, Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKI)
Non-Resident Fellow and former Executive Director, LKI
Research Associate, LKI
China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has led to greater Chinese outbound investment in Asia, including in Sri Lanka. This investment has recently come under scrutiny, due to intensifying geopolitical rivalries in the Indian Ocean as well as Sri Lanka’s prime location and ports in the region.
There are claims that by accepting Chinese outbound investment, Sri Lanka risks being stuck in a ‘debt trap’ and the displacement of its local workers by both legal and illegal Chinese labour. There are also concerns that Chinese investment has led to environmental damage and increased security risks for Sri Lanka and the neighbourhood. Furthermore, there is criticism that institutional weaknesses in Sri Lanka, including a lack of policy planning and transparency, are resulting in nonperforming infrastructure projects funded by Chinese investment.
The pattern of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka reveals a nuanced picture of benefits and costs. Similarly, it shows that a matrix of Sri Lankan, Chinese and multilateral policies are required to maximize the benefits and minimize any risks of Chinese investment. Sri Lanka is not in a Chinese debt trap. Its debt to China amounts to about 6 per cent of its GDP. However, Sri Lanka’s generally high debt levels show the country needs to improve its debt management systems. This step would also reduce any risk of a Chinese debt trap in the future.
Specific projects have contributed positively to Sri Lanka’s economy. Some have brought greater benefits than others, such as the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT), which has allowed the Colombo port to grow at a rapid pace. However, imports from China for projects in Sri Lanka have widened the trade deficit between the two countries. In addition, there have been only limited economic spillovers for Sri Lanka, including knowledge transfer in the local labour force.
The number of Chinese workers in Sri Lanka is rising but remains a very small percentage of the total labour force. While illegal migration is a concern, there are significantly fewer illegal residents from China than from neighbouring countries. Sri Lanka has relatively strong rules on outward migration but can better regulate inward migration based on labour market demands and economic priorities.
The environmental implications of Chinese investment projects in Sri Lanka are mixed. While earlier projects were more harmful, recent projects such as the CICT and Port City in Colombo have adapted to stricter environmental standards. To ensure consistently high environmental standards, Sri Lanka should strengthen its domestic regulations and seek more investments from green-friendly partners.
Concerns that China will use ports and other projects for military purposes are, in part, driven by geopolitical anxieties. In response, Sri Lanka has strengthened its naval presence at the Hambantota port. Continual oversight by technical experts is required to guard against security-related concerns and ensure public trust in the projects. Such trust will also grow by improving transparency and by pursuing a long-term, national infrastructure development plan.
Source: chathamhouse.org “Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka”
Note: This is chathamhouse.org’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
A crackdown on scholars with ties to China has triggered a reverse brain drain
By David Armstrong, Annie Waldman, and Daniel Golden (ProPublica) March 18, 2020
This article is co-published with ProPublica, a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power.
On the fourth floor of the University of Florida cancer-research building, the once-bustling laboratory overseen by professor Weihong Tan is in disarray. White lab coats are strewn over workbenches. Storage drums and boxes, including some marked with biohazard warnings, are scattered across the floor. A pink note stuck to a machine that makes copies of DNA samples indicates the device is broken.
No one is here on this weekday afternoon in February. On a shelf, wedged next to instruction manuals and binders of lab records, is a reminder of bygone glory: a group photo of Tan surrounded by more than two dozen smiling students and employees.
As the Florida lab sat vacant, a different scene unfolded half a world away in China, where a team of 300 scientists and researchers worked furiously to develop a fast, easy test for Covid-19. The leader of that timely project? Tan, the former Florida researcher.
The 59-year-old Tan is a stark example of the intellectual firepower fleeing the U.S. as a result of a Trump administration crackdown on university researchers with ties to China. Tan abruptly left Florida in 2019 during an investigation into his alleged failure to fully disclose Chinese academic appointments and funding. He moved to Hunan University in south-central China, where he now conducts his vital research.
Tan, a chemistry professor whose research has focused on diagnosing and treating cancer, quickly pivoted to working on a coronavirus test when the outbreak began in China. Boosted by a Chinese-government grant, he teamed up with researchers at two other universities in China and a biotechnology company to create a test that produces results in 40 minutes and can be performed in a doctor’s office or in non-medical settings like airport screening areas, according to a 13-page booklet detailing the test’s development and benefits. It has been tried successfully on more than 200 samples from hospitals and checkpoints, according to the booklet, which Tan shared with a former Florida colleague. It’s not clear how widely the test is being used in China.
Epidemiologists say that testing is vital to mitigate the spread of the virus. But the U.S. has lagged well behind China, South Korea, and Italy in the number of people tested. It’s hard to know if Tan’s test would have made a difference. The slow U.S. ramp-up has been blamed largely on bureaucratic barriers and a shortage of chemical agents needed for testing.
A star researcher funded by the National Institutes of Health, Tan taught for a quarter century at Florida and raised two sons in Gainesville. He was also a participant in the Thousand Talents program, China’s aggressive effort to lure top scientists from U.S. universities, and had been working part time at Hunan University for even longer than he had taught at Florida. Last year, alerted by the NIH, Florida began investigating his outside activities.
Tan declined to answer questions about his departure from Florida or his new test, but he provided documentation that his department chairman at Florida was “supportive” of his research in China as recently as 2015. He is one of three University of Florida researchers — along with others from the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center and the University of Louisville — who relocated to China while under investigation for allegedly hiding Chinese funding or affiliations with universities there.
Such nondisclosure may well be pervasive. A ProPublica analysis found more than 20 previously unreported examples of Thousand Talents professors who appear not to have fully revealed their moonlighting in China to their U.S. universities or the NIH.
The NIH has contacted 84 institutions regarding 180 scientists whom it suspects of hiding outside activities or funding, and it has referred 27 of them for federal investigation, said Michael Lauer, the agency’s deputy director for extramural research. “There’s no reason why the U.S. government should be funding scientists who are engaged in unethical behavior. It doesn’t matter how brilliant they are,” said Lauer, who declined to discuss specific professors under scrutiny. “If they don’t have integrity, we can’t trust them for anything. How can we be sure that the data they’re producing is accurate?”
Yet the government’s investigations and prosecutions of scientists for nondisclosure — a violation previously handled within universities and often regarded as minor — may prove counterproductive. The exodus of Tan and his colleagues highlights a disturbing irony about the U.S. crackdown; it is unwittingly helping China achieve a long-frustrated goal of luring back top scientific talent.
Thousand Talents aimed to reverse China’s brain drain to the West by offering elite Chinese scientists premier salaries and lab facilities to return home permanently. Finding relatively few takers, it let participants like Tan keep their U.S. jobs and work in China on the side.
Are U.S. universities failing to protect their Chinese faculty? “When the pressure comes down, they throw the researchers under the bus.”
By investigating Tan and other Chinese researchers for nondisclosure, the U.S. government is accomplishing what Thousand Talents has struggled to do. None of the professors identified in this article have been charged with stealing or inappropriately sharing intellectual property. Yet in the name of safeguarding American science, federal agencies are driving out innovators, who will then make their discoveries and insights in China instead of the U.S. The potential drawbacks hark back to an episode in the McCarthy era, when a brilliant rocket scientist at the California Institute of Technology was deported by the U.S. for supposed Communist sympathies and became the father of China’s missile program.
John Brown, the FBI’s assistant director of counterintelligence, told the U.S. Senate in November that participants in Thousand Talents and other Chinese talent programs “are often incentivized to transfer to China the research they conduct in the United States, as well as other proprietary information to which they can gain access, and remain a significant threat to the United States.”
A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., disputed such characterizations. “The purpose of China’s ‘Thousand Talents Plan’ is to promote talent flow between China and other countries and to galvanize international cooperation in scientific and technological innovation,” Fang Hong said. While firmly opposing any “breach of scientific integrity or ethics … we also condemn the attempt to describe the behaviors of individual researchers” as “systematic” intellectual-property theft by the Chinese government. “It is extremely irresponsible and ill-intentioned to link individual behaviors to China’s talent plan.”
Steven Pei, a University of Houston physics professor and former chair of the advocacy group United Chinese Americans, said that both countries have gone too far. “The Chinese government overreached, and the American government overreacted,” Pei said. “China tried to recruit, but it was unsuccessful. Now we help them do what they cannot do on their own.”
Pei added that U.S. universities are failing to protect their Chinese faculty: “When the pressure comes down, they throw the researchers under the bus.”
The NIH has long viewed collaborations with China as a boon for biomedical research, even initiating a formal partnership with China’s National Natural Science Foundation in 2010. But it became concerned in 2016 when it learned from the FBI that an Asian faculty member at M.D. Anderson had shared federal grant proposals he was reviewing with researchers at other institutions — a violation of NIH rules.
Examining the grant applications of its federally funded researchers, the NIH found many undisclosed foreign ties, particularly with research institutions in China. Some researchers were accepting dual appointments at Chinese universities and publishing results of U.S.-funded research under their foreign affiliation. Often, these foreign positions were not reported to the NIH or even the researchers’ own American universities.
In August 2018, the NIH launched an investigation to ensure that its researchers weren’t “double dipping” by receiving foreign funds for NIH-funded work or diverting intellectual property produced by federally backed research to other countries. The NIH found at least 75 researchers with ties to foreign talent programs who were also responsible for reviewing grant proposals. In some cases, Lauer said, Thousand Talents scientists with access as peer reviewers to confidential grant applications have downloaded them and emailed them to China. Other researchers have disclosed consulting or teaching in China but haven’t acknowledged that they’ve signed an employment contract with a Chinese university or are heading a lab, he said. The NIH gave the names of “individuals of possible concern” to the researchers’ institutions but did not make them public.
To gauge the extent of the problem, ProPublica matched Thousand Talents recipients identified on Chinese-language websites with their disclosures to their universities and grant applications to the NIH, which we obtained through public-records requests. We found at least 14 researchers who apparently did not disclose foreign affiliations to their U.S. universities, which included the University of Wisconsin, Stony Brook University, and Louisiana State University. We couldn’t determine if these researchers were also on the NIH’s confidential list.
Of 23 Thousand Talents recipients in our survey who have sought NIH funding, none reported conflicts of interest with Chinese universities to the agency. Just three revealed these positions in the bio sections of their grant applications. Because the NIH redacted foreign funding from the applications it provided to us, citing personal-privacy restrictions, we couldn’t tell if the researchers reported any grants from institutions in China.
It’s not always easy to define or prosecute theft of intellectual property in academe, especially if the research is considered basic and doesn’t require a security clearance. Unlike corporations that protect trade secrets, universities see science as an open, global enterprise and promote international collaborations. Practices such as photographing another research team’s specially designed lab equipment may be considered unethical by some, but they aren’t necessarily unlawful. Thus the U.S. government is trying to clamp down on suspected intellectual-property theft by targeting nondisclosure.
Yet the link between hiding Thousand Talents affiliations and stealing research secrets may be tenuous. Universities bear some responsibility for the nondisclosure, because they are supposed to certify the accuracy of information supplied to the NIH. Until recently, many schools were lax in enforcing disclosure rules. “It’s fair to say, at some universities, they have not really been paying attention to how their faculty spend their time,” Lauer said. One professor was away for 150 days a year and the university didn’t notice, he said.
Non-Chinese scientists, including doctors paid by pharmaceutical companies, also underreported outside income. Nor did universities want to restrict partnerships with Chinese universities; in the prevailing culture of globalization, they encouraged foreign collaborations and sought to open branches in China to boost their international prestige and attract outstanding, full-tuition-paying students.
Now times have changed, and Chinese scientists at U.S. universities are trapped in the backwash. Even those who rejected overtures from China have been hounded. Xifeng Wu, an epidemiological researcher, worked at M.D. Anderson for nearly three decades and amassed an enormous dataset to help cancer researchers understand patient histories. She twice turned down invitations to join Thousand Talents. But she collaborated with and accepted honorary positions at research institutions in China, where she grew up and attended medical school. Although she said she earned no income from these posts, the NIH identified her as a concern, and M.D. Anderson found that she did not always fully disclose her Chinese affiliations.
In early 2019, she left M.D. Anderson — one of at least four researchers who were pushed out of the center in the wake of the federal investigations. She has become dean of the School of Public Health, with a well-equipped laboratory, at Zhejiang University in southeast China.
Dong Liang, Wu’s husband and the chair of the pharmaceutical and environmental health sciences department at Texas Southern University, felt that M.D. Anderson buckled under pressure from the NIH, which provided the institution with more than $145 million in federal grants in 2018.
“A few years back, they wanted the collaborations [with China],” said Liang. “And now, they take it back.” The disclosure rules, said Liang, weren’t clear, “and now it becomes a violation.”
Professors who were in the process of being fired could have exercised their rights to a hearing before a faculty panel as well as “several rounds of peer discussions,” but they instead left “on their own volition,” M.D. Anderson spokeswoman Brette Peyton said. “As the recipient of significant NIH funding,” M.D. Anderson had a responsibility to follow up on the agency’s concerns or risk losing federal money, she said.
Baylor College of Medicine, in Houston, Tex., took a less punitive approach than M.D. Anderson. When the NIH alerted the Baylor College of Medicine that at least four researchers there — all ethnically Chinese — erred in their disclosures, Baylor corrected the documents and allowed them to continue working.
China began sending students to the U.S. in the late 1970s in the hope that they would return with American know-how and foster China’s technological prowess. But, especially after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, many of the students stayed in the U.S. after earning their degrees.
Established in 2008, Thousand Talents was intended to lure prominent scientists of Chinese ethnicity under age 55 back to China for at least half the year with generous salaries and research funds and facilities, as well as perks such as housing, medical care, jobs for spouses, and schools for children. Some Thousand Talents employment contracts require members to sign nondisclosure agreements related to their research and employment with Chinese institutions, according to a November 2019 report by the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
“The Chinese government has been the most assertive government in the world in introducing policies targeted at triggering a reverse brain drain,” David Zweig, a professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Huiyao Wang, director general of the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing, wrote in 2012.
The program succeeded in attracting 7,000 foreign scientists and researchers as of 2017, the Senate subcommittee reported. But it had trouble enticing professors at elite U.S. universities, who were reluctant to uproot their families and leave their tenured sinecures. It created a second tier for recruits who were “essentially unwilling to return full time,” Zweig and Wang wrote. They could keep their U.S. jobs and come to China for a month or two. Complaints arose in China about “fake returnees” who “work nominally in China for six months” but “in fact, most of them are still abroad,” according to a 2014 op-ed on the BBC News Chinese website.
Scandals marred the program’s reputation in the U.S. In 2014, Ohio State contacted the FBI about engineering professor Rongxing Li, who had fled to China. Li, a Thousand Talents member, allegedly had access to restricted NASA information. The U.S. attorney’s office did not bring charges against Li, who is teaching at Tongji University, in Shanghai.
Another Thousand Talents member, Kang Zhang, a professor of ophthalmology at the University of California at San Diego, resigned last year after reports that he failed to disclose being the primary shareholder of a Chinese company that’s focus overlapped with his UC research. No charges were filed against Zhang, now a professor at Macau University of Science and Technology.
Struggling to attract top researchers, Thousand Talents also reached out to non-Chinese scientists, like Charles Lieber, the Harvard chemistry chairman charged in January with making false statements to the U.S. government by denying his involvement with Thousand Talents and with Wuhan University of Technology. His three-year Thousand Talents contract called for Wuhan to pay Lieber $50,000 a month plus more than $1.5 million for a research lab, according to the Department of Justice. Lieber has not yet entered a plea. His attorney, Peter Levitt, declined comment.
“In the last five years, there has been a definite deliberate move toward targeting non-ethnic Chinese,” said Frank Figliuzzi, a former FBI assistant director for counterintelligence. “They’ve been getting so many rejections from their own people who don’t want to go back home and have fallen in love with their Western culture and their life. Or their wife won’t go back. Or their kids won’t go back.
“The other thing that we’ve seen, which I think is very troubling, ‘Hey, you don’t have to come back home full time.’ In the intel community, we call that a RIP, recruitment in place.”
Staying in the U.S. meant that Thousand Talents recipients had to report their Chinese positions to their American universities. Some didn’t. Richard Hsung, a professor of pharmaceutical sciences at the University of Wisconsin, affirmed annually on disclosure forms that he had “no reportable outside activities.” He acknowledged in an interview that, from 2010 to 2013, he was in Thousand Talents and worked part time as a visiting professor at Tianjin University, which has 25,000 students and is 70 miles southeast of Beijing.
He said that he didn’t mention the Tianjin position because the disclosure forms confused him. He includes “National Thousand Talent Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tianjin University” among his honors on the faculty website. “I was not flaunting it, but I was not hiding it,” he said.
His stints in China helped the University of Wisconsin, he said. “When there’s an opportunity such as this one, you take it, it expands the visibility, it expands interacting with more students in training, and they come here to help us.”
Also unreported was Hsung’s relationship with a biotech company in Shanghai. In corporate records, Shanghai Fangnan Biological Technology Co. says that it “was founded by the national ‘Thousand Talents Plan’ specially invited experts,” and it names Hsung as a director. Hsung said he was unaware of being listed as a board member and is asking the company to remove his name. He has consulted for the company “from time to time” but is compensated for expenses only, he said. “I have not been involved in any of their projects nor have they supported my research here,” he added in an email.
University of Wisconsin spokeswoman Meredith McGlone said that Hsung should have reported his job at Tianjin on outside activities forms, as well as an “unexpected honorarium of less than $5,000” from the Shanghai biotech firm. He has since updated his disclosure form to reflect the honorarium, she said. While the university has no “uniform penalty” for nondisclosure, she said, the appropriate response in cases, like Hsung’s, where there is no “evidence of intent to mislead” would be “additional training and perhaps a letter to the personnel file.”
The university convened a working group last year to “consider policies and practices intended to bolster security without sacrificing the free exchange of ideas,” McGlone said. It then added a question to the disclosure form: “Do you have an ongoing relationship with a foreign research institute or foreign entity?”
Each year, the University of Florida’s chemistry department evaluates its 40 or so faculty members by criteria that include amounts raised for research funding and the number and impact of studies published. Weihong Tan, who joined the department in 1996, was usually ranked among the top three professors every year, said a department official who asked not to be identified.
Tan’s research group developed a new way of generating molecules that bind to targeted cells, as a possible approach to identifying and treating cancers. He collaborated with researchers in other departments and became close with top deans and research officials on campus. He was popular with students. Each week, dozens of graduate and postgraduate researchers lined up in the hall outside his office, waiting to meet with him. He also won prestigious chemistry awards and developed an international reputation.
While at Florida, Tan maintained a connection to Hunan University, in China, where he studied as an undergraduate. His curriculum vitae states he was an adjunct professor at the school from 1993 through at least 2019, when he left Florida. The part-time teaching job is the CV’s only reference to any professional work in China.
In his annual disclosures to Florida, Tan did report positions and income in China, but not everything alleged by university investigators. In 2017, he said he was working 10 hours a week at Hunan for a salary of $30,000. In 2018, he said his hours had doubled to 20 a week, for $50,000. In 2019, he reported working a total of 20 hours a week for Hunan and the Institute of Molecular Medicine at Renji Hospital in Shanghai. His combined pay from the positions was $120,000, according to his form.
The association with Hunan began during a gap in Tan’s resume — between receiving a 1992 doctoral degree from the University of Michigan and starting postdoctoral work in 1994 at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Ames Laboratory.
In recent years, according to colleagues, Tan’s work in China intensified. He was making frequent trips there, sometimes traveling twice a month from Gainesville, one said. Tan told colleagues that his research in China complemented his Florida work, and that it was easier to conduct testing on people in China than in the U.S. His research in Florida focused on basic science testing that didn’t involve patients.
Tan knew his increasing workload in China was putting a strain on his full-time position in the U.S. He told a colleague he was considering asking for a leave of absence from Florida. It’s unclear if he did request a leave.
In January 2019, the NIH notified Florida that Tan might have undisclosed affiliations with foreign institutions as well as foreign research funding. The university then launched its own inquiry. It provided investigator notes regarding Tan and two other researchers allegedly involved in Chinese talent programs to a special state legislative committee reviewing foreign influence on publicly funded research. Those notes do not name the faculty members under investigation, instead referring to them by numbers such as “Faculty 1.” The details for Faculty 1 — including date of hire, area of research, department, and Chinese affiliations — match those of Tan.
Faculty members two and three appear to be Lin Yang, an NIH-funded professor of biomedical engineering, and Chen Ling, an up-and-coming pediatric cancer researcher.
Florida hired Yang from the University of Kentucky in 2014 as part of a “Preeminence Initiative” to boost its ranking among public universities. Yang traveled to Beijing for a Thousand Talents interview in 2016, according to the university’s investigative notes. The following year, he was selected for the program at a Chinese university.
Yang resigned his Florida position last year after the university began looking into his alleged failure to disclose his association with China’s Thousand Talents program. University investigators also allege that he hid being chief executive, founder, and owner of an unidentified China-based company.
“The Chinese government has been the most assertive government in the world in introducing policies targeted at triggering a reverse brain drain.”
In an email, Yang said he disputes many of Florida’s findings. He said he applied for a talent program but then turned it down. He said he never had any foreign grants or academic appointments in China while employed by Florida. Yang’s attorney, Peg O’Connor, said the University of Florida began a push in 2010 to encourage overseas collaborations. “To be punished for doing what the university called on you to do doesn’t make sense to me,” she said. “The effect of this is universities are bleeding good people.”
Ling, a part-time research associate professor, won multiple grants to study gene-therapy techniques that target the most common pediatric liver cancer. “Early in a very promising career, Ling is already making great strides in the development of innovative therapies for cancer,” the chairman of the medical school’s pediatrics department said in a 2012 press release.
Ling left Florida last year. The university investigative notes that appear to refer to Lin allege that he failed to inform the NIH that he was participating in a Chinese government-sponsored talent program, and that he received an unreported research grant from a Chinese foundation.
However, Ling did report working at Fudan University, in Shanghai, to University of Florida officials in 2018. His disclosure, which can be viewed at ProPublica’s Dollars for Profs website, shows that Fudan paid him $53,732 for activities that included “establishing a regular molecular biological laboratory, conducting gene therapy research, teaching curriculum, publishing manuscripts.” He indicated that the activity would require eight months of work each year. It’s unclear if Florida officials relayed this information to the NIH.
Ling, who did not respond to emails seeking comment, is continuing his research as a professor at Fudan. A former Florida colleague described him as “very smart” but somewhat naïve in dealing with conflict of interest issues. “I don’t think he did anything with malicious intent,” said the colleague. “He paid a heavy price for this.”
In 2015, when Weihong Tan was up for election to the Chinese National Academy of Sciences, his chemistry chairman at the University of Florida recommended him and lauded his ongoing research in China.
“We are very happy to see his great success at Hunan University in research and education,” William Dolbier wrote in the letter provided by Tan. “We are very supportive of his research and educational activities there.”
Tan’s positions were also publicly listed on the web before the NIH notified the University of Florida that there might be an issue.
The English-language website of Hunan University, beginning in at least March 2018, listed Tan as a vice president and director of a chemistry lab. According to the site, Tan had run the lab since 2010 and had been a vice president of the school since August 2017. The school also indicated Tan was a full professor there and supervised doctoral students. Tan appeared in an English-language video in 2017 to promote a textbook he edited and described himself as a distinguished professor of chemistry at both Florida and Hunan.
On several occasions, Hunan University publicly lauded Tan. In 2017, when he was named an associate editor of the Journal of the American Chemical Society, both the University of Florida and Hunan University put out press releases announcing the appointment. Florida officials at the time were apparently unaware of Tan’s positions in China, and the school’s release makes no mention of them. Hunan, on the other hand, lists his position in Florida.
Tan was also named an “honored professor” in 2017 at the East China University of Science and Technology. A story about a ceremony marking the appointment on that university’s website includes photographs of Tan touring school labs and meeting with faculty. It lists him as holding several academic posts in China as well as his University of Florida professorship.
After the NIH notified Florida at the beginning of 2019 about a potential problem with Tan, the university’s office of research began reviewing Tan’s emails. In correspondence, Tan acknowledged his Hunan jobs, according to the notes. He also allegedly used his Florida email account to conduct Hunan business.
The investigators found evidence that Tan had significant ties to Chinese government-sponsored talent programs and helped recruit U.S. researchers to those programs. The emails also indicated Tan received at least four research grants from Chinese government programs and didn’t tell the NIH about them. Of all of Tan’s extensive university and government ties with China, the only item he appears to have disclosed to the NIH and Florida was an adjunct teaching position at Hunan.
When Tan suddenly resigned his position in Florida last year, he told colleagues he was going to work full time in China but was vague about the reasons for leaving after almost a quarter century on campus. Administrators scrambled to find new mentors for the more than dozen graduate and postgraduate students working in his two labs on campus. The move was so abrupt that Tan’s wife stayed behind in Gainesville, according to colleagues.
Tan didn’t answer questions sent to him by email, although he did acknowledge receiving them. A federal investigation of Tan’s relationships in China is ongoing, according to the investigative summary provided by the university to state legislators.
The University of Florida said in a statement that it has taken steps to prevent other professors from joining Thousand Talents and concealing foreign positions. As a result of a new risk assessment process for detecting foreign influence that it introduced in 2018, it said, Florida is denying most requests from faculty to participate in foreign talent programs.
The university said it “maintains a robust and vigilant program to safeguard our technology and intellectual property from undue foreign influence, and to extend appropriate oversight to UF activities (and those of its faculty members) in connection with foreign organizations.” A spokesman declined to answer questions about individual professors, citing ongoing investigations.
Dolbier, the former chemistry chairman at Florida and now an emeritus professor, said Tan’s departure could have been avoided if he had disclosed all of his work in China. “He was not a money guy,” Dolbier said. “He was not out to steal from the United States. The development of these drugs was his primary focus and goal.” Dolbier added that Tan told him he would be glad to try to make his Covid-19 test available in the U.S.
David Armstrong is a senior reporter at ProPublica. Annie Waldman is a reporter at ProPublica covering education. Daniel Golden is a senior editor at ProPublica and the author of Spy Schools: How the CIA, FBI, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities (Henry Holt, 2017).
Source: The Chronicle of Higher Education “Hounded Out of U.S., Scientist Invents Fast Coronavirus Test in China”
Note: This is The Chronicle of Higher Education’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
Marisa Taylor March 23, 2020 / 4:25 AM / Updated 22 minutes ago
WASHINGTON (Reuters) – Several months before the coronavirus pandemic began, the Trump administration eliminated a key American public health position in Beijing intended to help detect disease outbreaks in China, Reuters has learned.
The American disease expert, a medical epidemiologist embedded in China’s disease control agency, left her post in July, according to four sources with knowledge of the issue. The first cases of the new coronavirus may have emerged as early as November, and as cases exploded, the Trump administration in February chastised China for censoring information about the outbreak and keeping U.S. experts from entering the country to help.
“It was heartbreaking to watch,” said Bao-Ping Zhu, a Chinese American who served in that role, which was funded by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, between 2007 and 2011. “If someone had been there, public health officials and governments across the world could have moved much faster.”
Zhu and the other sources said the American expert, Dr. Linda Quick, was a trainer of Chinese field epidemiologists who were deployed to the epicenter of outbreaks to help track, investigate and contain diseases.
As an American CDC employee, they said, Quick was in an ideal position to be the eyes and ears on the ground for the United States and other countries on the coronavirus outbreak, and might have alerted them to the growing threat weeks earlier.
No other foreign disease experts were embedded to lead the program after Quick left in July, according to the sources. Zhu said an embedded expert can often get word of outbreaks early, after forming close relationships with Chinese counterparts.
Zhu and the other sources said Quick could have provided real-time information to U.S. and other officials around the world during the first weeks of the outbreak, when they said the Chinese government tamped down on the release of information and provided erroneous assessments.
Quick left amid a bitter U.S. trade dispute with China when she learned her federally funded post, officially known as resident adviser to the U.S. Field Epidemiology Training Program in China, would be discontinued as of September, the sources said. The U.S. CDC said it first learned of a “cluster of 27 cases of pneumonia” of unexplained origin in Wuhan, China, on Dec. 31.
Since then, the outbreak of the disease known as COVID-19 has spread rapidly worldwide, killing more than 13,600 people, infecting more than 317,000. The epidemic has overwhelmed healthcare systems in some countries, including Italy, and threatens to do so in the United States and elsewhere.
During a press briefing on Sunday shortly after this story was first published, President Donald Trump dismissed the Reuters report as similar to other stories regarding the CDC that he described as “100 percent wrong,” without addressing whether the role had been eliminated.
U.S. CDC Director Dr. Robert Redfield maintained the agency’s presence in China “is actually being augmented as we speak,” without elaborating.
In a statement to Reuters before the report was published, the CDC said the elimination of the adviser position did not hinder Washington’s ability to get information and “had absolutely nothing to do with CDC not learning of cases in China earlier.”
The agency said its decision not to have a resident adviser “started well before last summer and was due to China’s excellent technical capability and maturity of the program.”
The CDC said it has assigned two of its Chinese employees as “mentors” to help with the training program. The agency did not respond to questions about the mentors’ specific role or expertise.
The CDC would not make Quick, who still works for the agency, available for comment.
Asked for comment on Chinese transparency and responsiveness to the outbreak, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred Reuters to remarks by spokesman Geng Shuang on Friday. Geng said the country “has adopted the strictest, most comprehensive, and most thorough prevention and control measures in an open, transparent, and responsible manner, and informed the (World Health Organization) and relevant countries and regions of the latest situation in a timely manner.”
One disease expert told Reuters he was skeptical that the U.S. resident adviser would have been able to get earlier or better information to the Trump administration, given the Chinese government’s suppression of information.
“In the end, based on circumstances in China, it probably wouldn’t have made a big difference,” Scott McNabb, who was a CDC epidemiologist for 20 years and is now a research professor at Emory University. “The problem was how the Chinese handled it. What should have changed was the Chinese should have acknowledged it earlier and didn’t.”
ALERT FROM CHINA’S CDC
Alex Azar, secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) said on Friday that his agency learned of the coronavirus in early January, based on Redfield’s conversations with “Chinese colleagues.”
Redfield learned that “this looks to be a novel coronavirus” from Dr. Gao Fu, the head of the China CDC, according to an HHS administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Dr. Redfield always talked to Dr. Gao,” the official said.
HHS and CDC did not make Azar or Redfield available for comment.
Zhu and other sources said U.S. leaders should not have been relying on the China CDC director for alerts and updates. In general, they said, officials in China downplayed the severity of the outbreak in the early weeks and did not acknowledge evidence of person-to-person transmission until Jan. 20.
After the epidemic exploded and China had imposed strict quarantines, Trump administration officials complained that the Chinese had censored information about the outbreak and that the United States had been unable to get American disease experts into the country to help contain the spread.
Azar told CNN on Feb. 14 that he and CDC director Redfield officially offered to send a CDC team into China on Jan. 6 but still had not received permission for them to enter the country. HHS oversees the CDC.
“Dr. Redfield and I made the offer on January 6th – 36 days ago, 60,000 cases and 1,300 deaths ago,” Azar said. “We made the offer to send the CDC experts in to assist their Chinese colleagues to get to the bottom of key scientific questions like, how transmissible is this disease? What is the severity? What is the incubation period and can there be asymptomatic transmission?”
Days later, the World Health Organization secured permission to send a team that included two U.S. experts. The team visited between Feb. 16th and 24th. By then, China had reported more than 75,000 cases.
On Feb. 25, the first day the CDC told the American public to prepare for an outbreak at home, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused China of mishandling the epidemic through its “censorship” of medical professionals and media.
Relations between the two countries have deteriorated since then, as Trump has labeled the coronavirus the “Chinese virus” – a description the Chinese have condemned as stigmatizing. Last week, the Chinese government announced that Americans from three U.S. news organizations, The New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, would be expelled from China.
ONCE ‘FRIENDS,’ NOW RIVALS
The decision to eliminate Quick’s job came as the CDC has scaled back the number of U.S. staffers in China over the last two years, the sources told Reuters.
“We had already withdrawn many technical public health experts,” the same expert said.
The CDC, however, disputed that staffing was a problem or that its information had been limited by the move. “It was not the staffing shortage that limited our ability” it said.
The U.S. CDC team in Beijing now includes three American citizens in permanent roles, an additional American who is temporary and around 10 Chinese nationals, the agency said. Of the Americans, one is an influenza expert with expertise in respiratory disease. COVID-19 is not influenza, though it can cause severe respiratory illness.
The CDC team, aside from Quick, was housed at U.S. Embassy facilities. No American CDC staffer besides Quick was embedded with China’s disease control agency, the sources said.
China in recent weeks has reported a dramatic slowdown in new cases, the result of drastic containment measures including the lockdown of Hubei province, home to 60 million people.
Nevertheless, the infectious disease experts who spoke with Reuters said, the United States could use people like Quick with contacts on the ground, especially if fears of a second wave of infections materializes.
Thomas R. Frieden, a former director of the CDC, said that if the U.S. resident adviser had still been in China, “it is possible that we would know more today about how this coronavirus is spreading and what works best to stop it.”
Dr. George Conway, a medical epidemiologist who knows Quick and had served as resident advisor between 2012 and 2015, said funding for the position had been tenuous for years because of a perennial debate among U.S health officials over whether China should be paying for funding its own training program.
Yet since the training program was launched in 2001, the sources familiar with it say, it has not only strengthened the ranks of Chinese epidemiologists in the field, but also fostered collegial relationships between public health officials in the two countries.
“We go there as credentialed diplomats and return home as close colleagues and often as friends,” Conway said.
In 2007, Dr. Robert Fontaine, a CDC epidemiologist and one of the longest serving U.S. officials in the adviser’s position, received China’s highest honor for outstanding contributions to public health due to his contribution as a foreigner in helping to detect and investigate clusters of pneumonia of unknown cause.
But since last year, Frieden and others said, growing tensions between the Trump administration and China’s leadership have apparently damaged the collaboration.
“The message from the administration was, ‘Don’t work with China, they’re our rival,’” Frieden said.
Trump’s re-election campaign sent out a statement Sunday evening dismissing controversy about the CDC’S cut as a matter of politics.
“Democrats are eager to politicize the coronavirus crisis and weaponize it against President Trump, the statement said. “In so doing, they’re siding with the Chinese and providing cover for Beijing’s cover-up.”
Marisa Taylor reporting from Washington; Additional reporting by Alexandra Alper in Washington, Tony Munroe and Cheng Leng in Beijing; Editing by Michele Gershberg and Julie Marquis
Source: Reuters “Exclusive: U.S. axed CDC expert job in China months before virus outbreak”
Note: This is Reuters’ report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
Supplementing the addition of this hardware will be a continued focus on the country’s logistics fleet, which is key to conducting blue-water operations — sustained, long-range maritime operations over oceans and deep waters — and securing logistics bases around the globe.
All fitted out, China’s second-ever aircraft carrier — and the first built entirely in China — is set to sail for sea trials (This reblogger’s note: the Chinese homegrown aircraft carrier has already been commissioned and named the Shandong now). The construction of the aircraft carrier represents a significant milestone in China’s steady rise as a major naval power. And barring any hiccups, Beijing will continue its ascent in the following decade to the degree that it challenges the United States for naval supremacy – at least in East Asia.
(This first appeared earlier in the year.)
From a Coastal Defense Force to a World Power
The might of the Chinese navy today is far beyond what it was just 30 years ago. As recently as the 1990s, it was effectively a coastal defense force with little ability to challenge its U.S. counterpart. But quick as the Chinese navy’s rise since then has been, its tremendous progress stems from evolution rather than revolution, as Beijing has carefully and incrementally introduced new designs and equipment into the navy before proceeding to intensified shipbuilding.
At the turn of the millennium, Beijing began producing new indigenous vessels, but many of the initial designs, such as the Type 051C destroyer, depended heavily on Russian and other foreign technology for their main armaments. At the same time, China continued to purchase Russian warships, such as Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines, as a hedge against the potential failure of their new designs.
Over the course of the century’s first decade, China restricted itself to constructing small batches of each warship type; only after engaging in comprehensive testing for each type did the country slowly transition to improved designs. This decade of cautious experimentation gave the country’s navy the confidence to settle on reliable models for high-rate production. Chinese shipyards rapidly rolled out the Type 054A frigate, the Type 039A submarine, the Type 052D destroyer (This reblogger’s note: China is building 8 bigger Type 055 destroyers with greater fire power, one of which has been commissioned, two, undergoing sea trial, three, launched and outfitting and two, being built. Please refer to https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china’s-giant-new-warship-packs-killer-long-range-missiles-109786 and https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3045764/chinas-most-advanced-destroyer-nanchang-formally-enters-service) and the Type 056 corvette, making the four classes of vessel the mainstay of the naval inventory. Such production, however, did not necessarily increase the size of the fleet but replaced aging and obsolete vessels that had remained in the naval inventory since the 20th century.
As naval authorities complete this modernization drive over the next two years, China is poised to significantly expand its strength and capabilities. The pace of China’s naval exercises and training regimen is already unprecedented, and the tempo is only likely to continue. The elimination of obsolete warships will provide China with an opportunity to improve not just the quality of its vessels, but also their quantity. If the country maintains its current rate of production, it could add approximately three destroyers each year from 2020 to 2030.
But an increase in the number of modern destroyers, frigates, corvettes and diesel-electric submarines only constitutes one aspect of the navy’s growing strength. Over the next 10 years, China will construct next-generation nuclear submarines that emit far less sound, build new types of aircraft carriers equipped with catapult launch systems and expand its amphibious fleet with the introduction of Type 075-class amphibious assault ships. Supplementing the addition of this hardware will be a continued focus on the country’s logistics fleet, which is key to conducting blue-water operations — sustained, long-range maritime operations over oceans and deep waters — and securing logistics bases around the globe.
Closing the Gap
The coming decade of development will significantly reduce, but not eliminate, the gap between China’s navy — already the second most powerful maritime force on the planet — and the U.S. Navy by 2030.
But even as China comes closer to rivaling the United States in global maritime strength, the two countries will continue to excel in different facets. Because the United States is largely secure and unchallenged in its home waters, it will retain its traditional focus on constructing a blue-water force. Accordingly, Washington has long emphasized aircraft carriers, large surface combatants and a sizable fleet replenishment force that can project influence and force around the globe. China will strive to develop these same blue-water capabilities with similar vessels, but it will focus on exercising power closer to home in the South China and East China seas. As a result, China will maintain a much larger fleet of small surface combatants and diesel-electric submarines — vessels that are ideal for combat in littoral environments close to home ports.
Other factors are also likely to consolidate China’s control of its immediate vicinity, including improved command and control, better training, greater access to land-based air power and missile forces, the existence of geographic chokepoints, as well as the concentrated nature of its forces – in contrast to the more dispersed deployment of U.S. forces. By 2030, the Chinese will likely be the dominant naval force up to an initial island chain that encircles the Yellow, East China and South China seas, while it will also enjoy significant advantages out to a farther limit running roughly from Japan to Indonesia through islands such as Guam and Palau. The United States, naturally, will remain largely dominant on the rest of the world’s oceans and seas.
Predicting China’s potential naval strength beyond 2030 is impossible, but the country could well seek to challenge the United States’ maritime dominance even farther out in the Pacific Ocean. For the decade to come, however, the country’s navy is set to go from strength to strength. It may not become the master of the open seas, but it will become the master of its own maritime backyard.
China’s Navy Prepares to Close the Gap on the U.S. is republished with the permission of Stratfor Worldview, a geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm.
Source: National Interest “How China’s Navy Will Rise: More Nuclear Submarines and Aircraft Carriers:”
Note: This is National Interest’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views. Some of my views can be seen in this reblogger’s note