Forbes says in its report “Huawei’s New Google Maps Rival ‘Launches In October’ As Battle Commences” on August 17, “According to Chinese media, Huawei is stepping up its rivalry with Google with plans to launch its own mapping service as soon as October.”
“Huawei CEO Ren Zhengfei warned the U.S. this week, that if its hand is forced by a U.S. blacklist which denies access to Google’s full-fat Android operating system, then it will set out to break Google and Apple’s global dominance of the smartphone ecosystem. This would be a clear part of that strategy. “
I said in my previous posts that Chinese engineers and technicians will strike back hard if insulted and cited as an example of China’s development of AEW&C airplanes as advanced as American ones when the US forced Israel to cancel its sell of AEW&C airplanes to China.
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on Forbes’ article, full text of which can be viewed at https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/17/watch-out-google-huawei-maps-could-launch-as-soon-as-october/#5dbd2dbb633f
The Chinese telecom giant faces the threat of losing access to Android systems as the US-China trade war escalates
By Sebastien Ricci
Chinese telecom giant Huawei unveiled its own operating system on Friday, as it faces the threat of losing access to Android systems amid escalating US-China trade tensions.
Richard Yu, the head of Huawei’s consumer business, told a press conference in the southern city of Dongguan that the new system, called HarmonyOS or HongMeng in Chinese, would “bring more harmony and convenience to the world.”
The highly-anticipated software is considered crucial for the tech group’s survival as it confronts a looming White House ban on US companies selling technology products to Huawei which could remove its access to Google’s Android operating system.
Yu said the new system was a “future-oriented OS” which would be “more smooth and secure,” and added it was “completely different from Android and iOS.”
Huawei said the first version of the operating system would launch later this year in its smart screen products, before expanding across a range of smart devices including wearable technology over the next three years.
“If you’re asking when will we apply this to the smartphone, we can do it at any time,” said Yu, adding that they gave priority to using Google’s Android operating system, which is compatible with Harmony.
“However, if we cannot use it (Android) in the future, we can immediately switch to the Harmony OS,” he said.
In May the company was swept into the deepening trade war between Beijing and Washington which has seen punitive tariffs slapped on billions of dollars of two-way trade.
Huawei – considered the world leader in superfast fifth-generation or 5G equipment and the world’s number two smartphone producer – has been blacklisted by US President Donald Trump amid suspicions it provides a backdoor for Chinese intelligence services, something the firm denies.
On Thursday Beijing slammed US rules banning Huawei and other Chinese companies from government contracts, saying they amounted to an “abuse of state power.”
As a result of US moves to blacklist Huawei, American companies are theoretically no longer allowed to sell technology products to the firm, but a three-month exemption period – which ends next week – was granted by Washington before the measure came into force.
That ban could prevent the Chinese tech firm from getting hold of key hardware and software including smartphone chips and elements of the Google Android operating system, which equips the vast majority of smartphones in the world, including those of Huawei.
Huawei has reportedly been working on its own operating system since 2012, but the group has always said publicly it did not want to replace its Android phones with a home operating system.
Yu told German newspaper Die Welt in an interview published in March that creating their own operating system was “Plan B.”
Huawei will be able to “develop at a lower cost a brand new ecosystem” and “mitigate its dependence on US suppliers for its software needs,” Kenny Liew, technology analyst at Fitch Solutions, told AFP.
However, smartphones using the system would mainly be confined to the Chinese market, Liew said.
Developing an operating system and the entire ecosystem that accompanies it is a complex affair.
Apart from Google’s Android, the only other popular operating system is Apple’s iOS, available exclusively on the iPhone.
Microsoft pulled the plug on its Windows Phone platform earlier this year, and Samsung’s Tizen system is barely known compared with Android and iOS.
But without access to the full version of Android or the popular services of Google – not to mention the many applications available on the Google Play store – Huawei may have trouble convincing consumers outside China to buy its phones.
Source: Asia Times “Huawei to start using its own operating system”
Note: This is Asia Times’ report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
Published Mon, Jul 1 2019 • 10:22 PM EDT Updated 6 hours ago
- “Huge amounts of capital and talent are going to be thrown at building self-reliance and establishing a kind of parallel ecosystem here without dependence on U.S. chips, operating systems,” said Ben Harburg, managing partner of MSA Capital, a Beijing-based venture capital firm.
- A homegrown Chinese semiconductor industry will likely hurt American chip makers as China will aggressively push their chips not just domestically but to other markets, said Harburg.
China going to work toward self-reliance in chips: MSA Capital
The U.S.-China trade war and the threat that Chinese firms could be cut off from using American technology is boosting China’s push for its own semiconductor industry.
“Huge amounts of capital and talent are going to be thrown at building self-reliance and establishing a kind of parallel ecosystem here without dependence on U.S. chips, operating systems,” said Ben Harburg, managing partner of MSA Capital, a Beijing-based venture capital firm.
“The rationale is that this moment created demand. Previously, it didn’t have demand for those Chinese chips,” Harburg told CNBC Monday at the World Economic Forum in Dalian, China.
While there was government money in the past to back such businesses, the understanding was that there were always U.S. chips to fall back on.
“That has changed now where there was a moment of complete desperation where there wasn’t an alternative to U.S. chips,” said Harburg, who added that MSA Capital is now investing more in core technologies like chips, core artificial intelligence and companies that aren’t dependent on U.S. chips.
Last month, Chinese tech giant Huawei was placed on a U.S. blacklist that required American firms to obtain government permission to sell to the company. The telecommunications equipment maker relies on some key components from U.S. firms and software from Google and Microsoft. Washington has granted a 90-day reprieve for now, but the threat remains a major problem for the company.
Huawei rival ZTE faced a similar situation last year, which significantly damaged the company.
A homegrown Chinese semiconductor industry will likely hurt American chip makers as China will aggressively push their chips not just domestically but to other markets, said Harburg.
“American companies in the hardware space like Apple have priced themselves out of markets like Africa. So if American chips aren’t going in there, it’s Chinese chips that are going into the phones being sold locally, ” he said.
Chinese tech manufacturers will also start targeting consumers in smaller cities in China, Harburg added.
Over the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested he will be reversing his government’s decision to ban American companies from selling products to the tech giant. Still, Trump said the issue of Huawei will be resolved only at the conclusion of the negotiations.
— CNBC’s Arjun Kharpal contributed to this report.
Source: CNBC “Tech war with the US is spurring Chinese firms to develop their own chips, says venture capitalist”
Note: This is CNBC’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
The American government’s campaign to take down a $110 billion company with global operations that underpin critical infrastructure in over 100 countries around the world may fill China hawks in D.C. with glee. But, Paul Triolo writes, if you ask anyone deeply involved in information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains, you will instead hear their dread of the impending broad losses in revenue, harm to R&D capacity, and significant setback for 5G network deployment.
Paul TrioloJune 18, 2019
The ongoing drama with China’s largest and most innovative technology company, Huawei, illustrates how the narrative on innovation in China and the United States has changed, bringing along with it ill-conceived goals and priorities on both sides. Lately, the narrative coming from just a portion of the so-called “Washington consensus” on China — basically, that China has cheated and subsidized its way to a technological position that rivals and aims to “dominate” the U.S. — accepts myths about China and innovation, while largely ignoring the role that 30 years of access to China has played for the most innovative companies in the U.S.
The somewhat stunning accusation earlier this month by some pundits — namely, that Google’s concern over an Android fork brought about by the U.S. action could harm U.S. national security and was somehow prompted by pressure from Beijing — illustrates how this debate is characterized by “low information” responses to complicated problems. The Google concern was soon echoed in hushed tones by other leading U.S. technology companies, all highlighting the critical nature of China’s talent pool, market, and innovative private sector to their current and future business models. However, they all had to tiptoe around the China hawks in D.C. to make their case, fearful of appearing to push too hard against the current narrative, to make a case that policymakers in D.C. understood viscerally in previous administrations. This sensitivity is testament to how far the U.S.-China Tech Cold War has come, spilling over into the broader narrative on China.
Ironically, the Huawei case has both crystallized U.S. concerns about supply chains originating in China for critical technologies — even though the U.S. has no appreciable Chinese telecom equipment in its own networks — and highlighted the dependence of Huawei on critical and irreplaceable U.S. technology supplies, and U.S. companies on Huawei and the China market to drive research and development (R&D) and innovation in the age of 5G and artificial intelligence. This latter fact appears, shockingly, to be irrelevant to those so obsessed with Huawei that they are willing to blow up global mobile supply chains to ensure that the U.S. military can operate globally on “secure and controllable” networks free of China-origin gear.
Some U.S. suppliers make 30 percent of their revenues from Huawei
The global ramifications of the seemingly innocuous Commerce Department press release issued unceremoniously on May 15 are now glaringly apparent. Someone within the mobile industry trade group GSMA earlier this month leaked details of an internal scenario-planning document that estimated the potential cost just for Europe of the Huawei action at $62 billion — though over what period and on what basis was not clear — pushing out 5G deployment by nearly 2 years. Both numbers are probably conservative estimates. We do not yet have the means to calculate the potential costs here. This is because without access to U.S. technology, no carrier around the world can count on Huawei gear for 5G upgrades, and this will also likely mean that carriers will have to tear out and replace their Huawei 4G gear, most not yet fully amortized, at great cost and time, including training engineers on new equipment. Since this has never been done at such a scale, across so many carriers, and with such advanced technologies, no one knows the costs.
The mobile industry trade group GSMA reportedly estimated the potential cost just for Europe of the Huawei action at $62 billion — though over what period and on what basis was not clear — pushing out 5G deployment by nearly 2 years. Both numbers are probably conservative estimates.
That is the infrastructure side of Huawei’s business. The consumer side also stands to suffer hugely — Huawei shipped nearly 200 million smartphones globally last year, and was set to lead on 5G handset deployments. Thus 45 percent of the firm’s revenue is at risk, and its smartphone sales have fallen off a cliff. All of those phones and each piece of Huawei infrastructure gear, from base station controllers to servers in data centers, are chock-full of U.S. semiconductors and software, along with myriad other components from its more than 1,000 U.S. suppliers. Revenue from Huawei for U.S. suppliers ranges from the low single digits to up to 20 percent or as much as 30 percent. This was set to rise sharply as the firm prepared to deploy huge numbers of infrastructure and smartphones globally at the launch of the 5G era. One Huawei supplier told me that the 20 percent of their revenue from China was essentially all plowed right back into R&D, for both the U.S. and China markets.
It is in part this loss that U.S. companies are pointing to as problematic for their future ability to conduct R&D at the level to which they have become accustomed. And indeed the loss is not just revenue. Chinese firms like Huawei are pushing the envelope on innovation across mobile infrastructure and smartphones. One large carrier I spoke with claimed that Huawei 5G gear was three to five years ahead of other competitors. Regardless of how accurate this is, the point is that Huawei is pushing innovation in one of the most advanced technology sectors globally, including new semiconductor designs, systems architectures, software, and artificial intelligence development, as well as across many associated industries such as autonomous driving and smart cities.
5G political slop
That none of this was taken into account by U.S. decision makers was the result of many factors. Foremost among them is that there is no U.S. government entity responsible for understanding global information and communications technology (ICT) supply and value chains, U.S. company R&D budgets, and innovation systems, let alone the importance of 5G and its associated technologies and their supply chains. The current laserlike focus on national security, stemming from the U.S. National Security Strategy and the U.S. “national security innovation base,” means that there is largely no audience that is willing to listen or equipped to fully understand arguments from industry about economies of scale, supply chains, and innovation.
Revenue from Huawei for U.S. suppliers ranges from the low single digits to up to 20 percent or as much as 30 percent. One Huawei supplier told me that the 20 percent of their revenue from China was essentially all plowed right back into R&D, for both the U.S. and China markets.
And 5G seems to be particularly difficult for Washington policy elites to come to grips with. Virtually untalked about within the growing “Washington consensus” for most of 2018, and even after my firm published “The Geopolitics of 5G” in November, it suddenly was everywhere as we turned the corner into 2019. But the concern over 5G in D.C. has not been generated from within industry circles, but from deep within the U.S. government, with D.C. think tanks piling on. As Anthony Rutkowski observed in May: “The initial, essential step toward understanding 5G is to perform an intellectual body purge of endless disgorging of cluelessness and disinformation that emerges from the Washington White House and radiates out around that city and then to the outside world that it infects. The institutes, pundits, self-professed experts, summits, and even the U.S. press all pretty much feed out of the same trough of 5G political slop that gets passed around as incantations of ignorance, spin, and K-street lobbying.” Ouch.
This is the result of complicated historical factors. First, the U.S. government lacks a high-level entity responsible for balancing national security concerns with the impact of particular policy choices on U.S. industry and its innovation capacity. Simply put, there is no body capable of doing sophisticated analysis of how an action like the Huawei Entity List decision will impact U.S. companies and global supply chains. The same is true for the U.S. think tank community. While pockets of excellence on narrow specific technology policy areas exist, there are none dedicated to the intersection of geopolitics and technology at a time when nuanced and in-depth analysis of policy is most needed. In addition, the Washington narrative holds that the 30-year entanglement of U.S. technology supply chains in China is now a major national security threat — to the U.S. military and U.S. critical infrastructure — and needs to be unwound, regardless of the costs. This has been fueled by such stories — still independently unconfirmed and strongly denied by all the alleged victims — as the Bloomberg piece last fall alleging that Chinese subcontractors had implanted rice-sized hardware backdoors on server motherboards destined for major U.S. cloud services providers. These two factors make it likely that the Digital Iron Curtain currently slowly but inexorably falling between the U.S. and China, across flows of goods and services, finance and investment, and personnel will continue its journey, with unknown consequences.
Eroding the ability of U.S. companies to innovate for a global market
Many argue that this will be good for China in the long run, forcing Chinese tech companies to go cold turkey on their addiction to Western technology. A hard look at Huawei’s supply chains suggests that local production could begin to replace Western suppliers sooner than many have anticipated. Also in vogue is the argument that U.S. companies can weather the revenue loss from China and continue to innovate. This type of reasoning is being done by camps with a limited view of how global value chains are developed and sustained. Huawei in fact did not intend, as some have suggested, to become entirely independent of Western technology. In today’s global technology ecosystems, this is not feasible for any technology company. But forced to, Huawei will attempt to become independent, both boosting China’s domestic capabilities across the board, and at the same time, eroding the ability of U.S. companies to innovate for a global market, and boosting the position of European and Asian suppliers not subject to the Entity List provisions. The Huawei action also creates a broader dynamic, where U.S. companies will now be increasingly considered as untrustworthy partners for other Chinese and foreign firms.
Huawei in fact did not intend, as some have suggested, to become entirely independent of Western technology. But forced to, Huawei will attempt to become independent, both boosting China’s domestic capabilities across the board, and at the same time, eroding the ability of U.S. companies to innovate for a global market, and boosting the position of European and Asian suppliers.
Huawei is deeply embedded in the global tech division of labor. It licenses from British firm ARM — owned by Japan’s Softbank — processor technology architectural frameworks and services, integrates advanced memory from U.S., Japanese, and Korean suppliers, and leverages manufacturing capabilities from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) that incorporate critical Dutch technology, along with software from a dozen key U.S. suppliers. Its chip designs depend on electronic design automation software from U.S. and German companies. The U.S. portions of these innovation frameworks will be the primary casualties if the Entity List action remains in place.
Adding to the snowballing costs of the Huawei action are Beijing’s suite of countermeasures, which have not yet been fully deployed. None of them are of the same sheer throw weight as the U.S. Huawei action — taking down a $110 billion company with global operations that underpin critical infrastructure in over 100 countries around the world is a tall order to top. China controls a limited number of technology inputs, rare earths, and some critical assemblies and mechanical parts or capacitors that are best produced in China now with high precision and low cost. None are essentially irreplaceable, but trying to reproduce these parts of the global tech supply chain would come at a considerable cost.
Over the next weeks, we will see how China rolls out elements of its “unreliable entity list” in response to the U.S. action. It will not be pretty — already there are lots of rumors swirling around Beijing among U.S. companies. Powerful government bodies, including the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, called in about a dozen U.S. and foreign companies earlier this month to warn them generically about cutting off key technology supplies, offering vague warnings about the consequences. But urging U.S. companies to violate U.S. law is not a particularly wise move — they are also already lobbying in Washington, and do not want to be seen as carrying Beijing’s water on this.
Chances for finding an off-ramp remain slim. Huawei — with Beijing’s blessing — would have to come to Washington in a repentant mood, and agree to a humiliating agreement. It is not even clear that Washington would play ball here. The firm’s only hope is that both sides agree to save the company to get the stalled trade negotiations back on line. Plan B is clearly to forge ahead, ordering 10,000 developers to redesign Huawei’s 4G base stations and a key antenna without U.S. components, and rushing out the Hongmen forked Android operating system — the one Google is concerned about — by September.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has yet to articulate a clear message about the Huawei Entity List action: Messaging has been nonexistent. In addition, there has been no discussion from policy circles in Washington about how U.S. companies should prepare for competition in a world where Huawei will be selling smartphones with forked Android operating systems in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere, at Google’s expense. Huawei will also be developing alternative semiconductor and software suppliers, while some of the most innovative firms in the U.S. must seek to grow with hugely diminished market and R&D opportunities. Then there are all the U.S. allies in Europe that will be struggling with the security of their 4G networks and the huge costs of the move to 5G, all the while facing delayed deployment while EU companies forego the innovation to come on top of those networks. This appears to amount to, at the least, strategic malpractice.
We are in uncharted waters, in a sinking ship of globalized ICT supply chains, with U.S. tech companies furiously bailing water, while China hawks in D.C. rub their hands with glee, eager to see Huawei go under. It will be an interesting summer…
Source: supchina “U.S.-China supply chains and innovation: The risks the Huawei hawks don’t understand”
Note: This is supchina’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
Stratfor says in its article “Why Europe Won’t Shut the Door on Huawei” that though due to US warning on security in using Huawei, EU will only pressure member states to “update their security requirements for 5G partners to mitigate the potential risks”. It will let its members decide whether to use Huawei.
However, the article concludes: “(M)any countries that already use Huawei’s equipment for 4G may ultimately decide that the easiest, cheapest and fastest route is to continue using the Chinese company for their 5G networks. But even then, they’ll probably still introduce some restrictions, or at least additional controls, on the company — both to appease the United States, and to address domestic concerns about the security implications of such a crucial technology.”
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on Stratfor’s article, full text of which can be viewed at https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-europe-wont-shut-door-huawei
By Zhang Zhouxiang |China Daily |Updated: 2019-06-12 07:36
At a news conference on Sunday, Geng Shuang, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo for making false claims about Chinese telecommunications enterprise Huawei. China Daily writer Zhang Zhouxiang comments:
One remark by Geng in particular created a buzz online. He said that Huawei had obtained 46 commercial contracts for 5G networks in 30 countries worldwide by June 6, and some of the countries are allies of the United States, despite Pompeo working hard to persuade them not to use Huawei products.
Anybody with a normal mind will find it hard to understand why the world’s only superpower is so afraid of a private enterprise from China that it is intent on persuading its allies to cut all business ties with the company.
Business is business, and in business there should only be commercial factors to consider. When any country, be it in Europe or anywhere else in this world, needs 5G services, all it wants are good products, good services and good prices.
Huawei offers all these. According to a report by IPlytics, a patent big data company based in Berlin, four Chinese companies own 36 percent of the world’s patents necessary for 5G standards; Huawei alone has 1,554 of them.
If European countries blindly exclude Huawei from their purchasing lists as the US requires, they would have to spend an extra 428.7 billion yuan ($61.9 billion) building their 5G networks.
Therefore, it is natural for European countries to choose Chinese companies for the construction of their 5G networks. Actually, Huawei is popular among US companies and US consumers, too. Just as Nicholas Negroponte, founder of MIT Media Lab, said in an open letter in May, by banning Huawei, US authorities will force US consumers to choose not-so-good services with higher prices.
Especially, many small telecom companies use Huawei devices in their 5G networks, and if Huawei is banned, they might not be able to benefit from the new technology. US farmers need 5G networks to analyze data of their crops, while US small businesses need them to analyze and decide their purchasing lists.
It is time the US authorities reconsidered their choice: Will they choose being connected, or being out of date simply because of their prejudice against a Chinese company?
Source: China Daily “Pompeo’s scare-mongering falls flat”
Note: This is China Daily’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
Plan for Long-term Victory
In the long run, China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI) will bring economic growth to developing countries and expand China’s market there. It will enable China to switch lots of its exports from the US to those countries. Moreover, BRI will enable China to move the industries that produce goods for export to the US to the industrial parks built by BRI to avoid US tariff hikes and reduce labor costs. China will thus establish its invincible position in its trade war with the US.
According to Sun Tze, in a war one has to establish one’s invincible position and do not miss the opportunity to defeat one’s enemy.
Regarding to trade war, China is an entirely different country. Its government has centralized power to ban the import of enemy’s goods without tariff hikes. Its reduction in purchase of US agricultural products can do much greater damages than US tariff hikes on Chinese exports.
Trump’s Ingenious Move without Surprise
Seeing that tariff hikes are unable to subdue China, US President Trump tries another way to attack China. He remembers well that China’s telecom giant ZTE would have been killed by US Congress if he had not interfered in its favor. He saw his opportunity to subdue China through attacking Huawei, another Chinese telecom giant.
Americans have already been jealous at Huawei’ leading position in 5G in the world. Trump took the lead in banning Huawei’s 5G in the US and has been telling other countries also to boycott Huawei’s 5G with the lie about Huawei’s espionage on behalf of the Chinese government. Failing to make others ban Huawei’s 5G, Trump invents a much more evil way to kill Huawei by placing Huawei in US trade blacklist to cut US supplies of components and technology that Huawei needs for its survival.
Now tariff hikes are the frontal engagement in Trump’s trade war with China, but banning and placing Huawei in US trade blacklist are indeed an ingenious move that may do real harm to China..
US government’s large amount of tariff revenue from the hikes proves that the tariff hikes have failed to reduce Chinese exports to the US. It proves that the harm caused by tariff hikes to China is limited. Killing Huawei and threatening further killing of other major Chinese tech companies might have really made China suffer.
China has been prepared for Trump’s Ingenious Move
However, the Huawei move though Ingenious lacks surprise. At the very beginning of Trump’s trade war last year, Xi Jinping told Chinese firms to rely on themselves. He made Chinese firms realize the danger of dependence on US supplies of technology and components. Since then Chinese enterprises have been working hard to free from their dependence on US supplies.
It has especially been the case for Huawei. Trump’s banning and telling others to ban Huawei and US efforts to extradite Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou have caused Huawei to develop substitutes for US supplies since long ago. When Trump placed Huawei on the blacklist, Huawei had already developed substitutes for US supply of components and been developing its own operation systems so that Trump is unable to win with that ingenious move.
China’s Ingenious Surprise Move
Banning supply of rare earth materials for the US may be China’s ingenious move but it also lacks surprise. There has now been too much media report on that now to warn the US about that. China bought rare earth technology from the US so that I do not think it is difficult for the US to develop the technology to produce substitutes.
In his recent visit to Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart President Putin concluded an agreement to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the ruble and the yuan in order to bypass the US dollar. That is an ingenious surprise move that hits the US where it is most vulnerable.
US economy will soon be surpassed by China. Its military is being caught up by China and Russia. The financial dominance of US dollar is the only strong point that the US still maintains. If it has lost that dominance, there will be no US hegemony at all.
The agreement between China and Russia may set an example for other countries so that trade balance settlement everywhere may gradually be conducted through other currencies not only Russian and Chinese currencies. As a result, US dollar will not longer be the major currencies for trade and financial reserve.
In fact, most countries in the world want to put an end to US dollar’s dominance now. EU has developed Euro for trade settlement in EU. Malaysian PM Mahathir has suggested the use of gold as substitute for US dollar.
The US is hard up now. It does not have enough revenue to make ends meet so that it has to borrow lots of funds from other countries. However, it has no financial problem as it can issue as much US dollars as it needs due to the financial dominance of US dollars.
If US dollar is no longer the dominant trade and reserve currency in the world, the US will not be able to borrow as much as it will for its excessive military spending to maintain its military hegemony.
Article by Chan Kai Yee