Popularresistance.org’s article “U.S. imperialism views the One Belt One Road as an existential threat to the domination and monopoly of the dollar” points out the reason of US attacks at China’s BRI initiatives though I do not agree with its orthodox socialist views.
The article says,“U.S. imperialism views the One Belt One Road as an existential threat to the domination and monopoly of the dollar. China is becoming deeply connected to Asia, Europe, and Africa and this spells doom for U.S. imperial hegemony.”
The article has the vision to point out the threat of BRI to the dominance of US dollars.
According to the article BRI has promoted economic growth of participating countries so that trade between China and BRI countries has grown fast to a quarther of China’s entire trade. It says, “The more that China dominates trade and investment worldwide, the less likely that these nations will continue to use the U.S. dollar to conduct its economic affairs.” No wonder the US has been attacking BRI so fiercely.
The article’s orthodox socialist view regards EU as US ally in attacking BRI. No, EU has been fighting against dominance of US dollar for a long time as proved by its development of a unified European currency the Euro.
Moreover, EU has becoming interest in BRI since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Italy and France. It is certainly interested in the expansion of the market in developing countries cause by BRI.
So is Japan and South Korea as proved by their desire for the establishment of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
I have to point out that China pursues harmony and cooperation instead of conflicts as advocated by the article. It is the US that is used to create conflicts and resort to force when it is able to. US trade war with China is a typical example. China is forced to fight back, but it is still sincere in seeking win-win cooperation with the US. However, the US is fond of conflicts. It always refuses win-win cooperation in the world.
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on popularresistance.org’s article, full text of which can be viewed at https://popularresistance.org/u-s-imperial-decline-and-the-belt-and-road-initiative-the-most-important-global-struggle-of-the-century/
Washington Free Beacon carries US expert Aaron Kliegman’s article “Report: China, Russia Deepening Defense Partnership”, that says, “Expert says Sino-Russian relationship a growing concern for the U.S.”
US former President Obama was stupid in pushing China and Russia together to form a de facto alliance against US hegemony. A few wise US experts including Mr. Kliegman have realized the threat of the alliance to US hegemony.
Obama’s successor President Trump seems to see that problem. His attempt to improve relations with Russia was hindered by his opponents. They exploited that to overthrow him with the allegation of Trump’s collusion with Russia to win his presidential election.
Trump tries to improve relations with China, but all US politicians around him are hostile to China due to Thucydides trap. As a result, Trump conducts a stupid trade war with China to please them and the Americans affected by them.
Due to US domestic politics of fighting for vested interests to hinder whatever s party’s attempt to achieve something for national interests, the US is unable to drive a wedge between China and Russia to break their alliance.
It is Kliegman’s wishful thinking that when the West is fighting one of the two allies, the other will exploit the conflict to achieve what the other wants. No, the other will help its ally to defeat the West because of their common interests as allies.
It is hard for the US to win a war with one the two allies but the US will certainly lose if the two allies joint force in a war with the US. That is the trouble the alliance constitutes for the US.
China helped Russia to develop its own food processing industry to enable Russia’s success of counter sanction against the West. Russia is now providing China will agricultural products to help China win trade war against the US. That is how the alliance works in peace time. In war, the alliance will join forces to win.
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on Washington Free Beacon’s article, full text of which can be viewed at https://freebeacon.com/national-security/report-china-russia-deepening-defense-partnership/?utm_source=Freedom+Mail&utm_campaign=ddfe752511-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_19_COPY_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b5e6e0e9ea-ddfe752511-46069085.
SCMP says in its report “Russia offers 2.5 million acres of land to Chinese farmers, but will it ease Beijing’s soybean shortage?” that Russia will provide China with vast land that may grow soyabean to replace import from the US but asks the question whether China will be able to use the land to ease its soyabean shortage.
The land may be virgin land in Russia’s remote east, but it is close to China’s northeast where China farmers grew soyabean in the past to turn the barren land into land suitable for farming. In the past, Northeast China exported lots of soyabean to the US.
Now the win-win cooperation between Russia and China will enable Chinese farmers to grow soyabean on the virgin land in Russia’s vast east and turn the land into farm land.
The China-Russia de factor alliance will put an end to not only US military but also US economic hegemony.
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on SCMP’s report, full text of which can be viewed at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2159713/russia-offers-25-million-acres-land-chinese-farmers.
Bill Bishop of Sinocism January 19
The Chinese Communist Party emphasized its expanding global ambitions in a remarkable 5,500 character treatise on the front page of Monday’s “People’s Daily.”
“The world needs China, as all humans are living in a community with a shared future … That creates broad strategic room for our efforts to uphold peace and development and gain an advantage.” — Communist Party “manifesto” on China’s role in the world
Why it matters: This is further evidence of the seriousness of China’s broad global vision. President Xi Jinping sees a remarkable opportunity, enhanced by the Trump presidency and its “America First” policies, to reshape the global order in ways that legitimize the Chinese political system and create more strategic advantages for the China.
The Xi Era and its growing global ambition was ushered in during the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress last fall, where Xi vowed to increase China’s global influence and reshape global governance. As Xi said in his report to the Congress: “It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”
This week’s article — called 紧紧抓住大有可为的历史机遇期 or “Tightly grasping the very promising period of historical opportunity” and signed by the pseudonym “Xuanyan 宣言,” which means manifesto — called for the nation to grasp the historic opportunity now before the nation, according to state-run media.
•Noting the problems facing the world, such as a “democratic deficit,” “governance deficit,” “development trap,” wealth gap, terrorism and climate change, the article said “the drawbacks of capitalism-led political and economic systems are emerging; the global governance system is experiencing profound changes and a new international order is taking shape.”
Under the headline “Make China Great Again,” the South China Morning Post quoted the manifesto calling out the “drawbacks” of the the capitalist economic system and said “a new international order is taking shape,” with China facing an historic opportunity to “restore itself to greatness and return to its rightful position in the world.”
Be smart: China is not getting back into the business of exporting revolution as it did in the Mao-Era, and China’s style of Leninist-Mercantilism is unlikely to fit other countries. But Xi and the Communist Party’s Marxist theoreticians who believe in “historical determinism”, a phrase that appears repeatedly in the manifesto, see America’s retreat as a moment to increase China’s influence in the world.
Source: AXIOS “China wants to reshape the global order”
Note: SCMP’s article believes the People’s Daily article means China wants to replace the US as world leader. It quotes Jonathan Sullivan, director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, as saying, “It reflects the Chinese leadership’s belief that right now is a huge opportunity for China to stake out a global leadership role.”
If China wants world leadership now, its leaders are stupid as China is far from strong enough to be world leader. I believe AXIOS’ note “Be smart” is more sensible. As I pointed in my previous posts, Xi Jinping Though on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is but China’s declaration that China can say no. What China wants is but to enhance its influence in the world to put an end to US world hegemony and make the world a multipolar one.
Full text of SCMP’s article can be found at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2128711/make-china-great-again-communist-party-seeks-seize.
Michael Lind August 21, 2016
The United States is in long-term relative decline. In absolute terms, the America of the future will be richer. But because other countries like China and India, and other regions like Africa, are growing more rapidly, America’s share of global wealth will decline. So will America’s share of global military power, which, in the industrial era, is loosely rather than perfectly correlated with relative economic weight.
Primacy, as a concept in international relations, can refer either to polarity (a country’s share of global economic and military resources) or to hegemony (a specialized function within an interdependent international community). Whether defined as polarity or hegemony, American global primacy is coming to an end.
Projections of national shares in GDP in 2050 by think tanks, investment banks and consulting firms tend to converge at the prediction that the world will have three economic poles or cores—China, the United States and Europe—or perhaps four, if India enjoys rapid and sustainable growth. “The World in 2050,” a report by PwC, assigns 20 percent of global GDP (in purchasing power parity) to China, 14 percent to the United States and India, and a mere 12 percent to Europe as a whole in 2050. A 2015 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit paints a similar picture, concluding: “By 2030 the top three economies of the world will be the US, China and India. Such will be the growth of the two latter countries, in particular, that by 2050 they will each be richer than the next five (Indonesia, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and the UK) put together. This will represent a scale of wealth relative to the rest of the top ten that is unique in recorded history.” Indeed, to use PwC’s numbers, China, the United States, India and Europe together would account for around 60 percent of global GDP. Sub-Saharan Africa’s population will explode in the next few generations, but its successful development, if it occurs, will take a long time.
The “Brexit” vote in the UK, together with the growth of nationalism and populism in Europe, has doomed the elite project of creating a federal Europe that can act as a superpower in world politics. Europe will be a rich but fragmented trading bloc surrounded by colossal continental powers, the United States, China and perhaps India.
Tomorrow’s world will be multipolar, not simply bipolar or tripolar. The rise of China and India to great-power status will allow regional powers, from Turkey to Vietnam and Brazil, to play the continent-states against one another and pursue their own independent interests.
The period between 1914 and 2014 can accurately be described as “the American century.” At some point during World War I, the gross domestic product of the United States passed that of the British Empire as a whole. Around a century later in 2014, according to the IMF, the GDP of China passed that of the United States.
After a hundred years in which it typically enjoyed a huge advantage in wealth and power over the next nearest competitors, with China the United States may finally have met a true “peer competitor.” Although per capita income in China is still much lower than in the United States, China is not only the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), but also the world’s largest manufacturing nation—producing 52 percent of color televisions, 75 percent of mobile phones and 87 percent of the world’s personal computers. The Chinese automobile industry is the world’s largest, twice the size of America’s. China leads the world in foreign exchange reserves. The United States is the main trading partner for seventy-six countries. China is the main trading partner for 124. With growing wealth comes growing power. China is now second only to the United States in its defense spending.
For the first time since it surpassed the British Empire in the early 1900s, the United States faces a rival that, though poorer in per capita terms and still inferior in many ways, has an economy equal in scale to its own. This is a new development. America’s earlier challengers, Germany and the Soviet Union, were nowhere near the United States in their size and resources. Other nations, like Japan, were even less able to challenge U.S. economic and potential military primacy (which began with World War I), or U.S. international institutional hegemony (which began during and continued after World War II).
John Maynard Keynes observed: “The great events of history are often due to secular changes in the growth of population and other fundamental economic causes, which escaping by their gradual character the notice of contemporary observers, are attributed to the follies of statesmen.” The increasing frustrations in U.S. foreign policy have less to do with the failures of American leaders than with deep, long-term trends that are diffusing both wealth and power away from both the United States and Europe.
In particular, the rise of China is the indirect cause, or enabling factor, of many of America’s setbacks. China’s backing helped Russia oppose the United States and its European allies during the crisis over Ukraine. China’s assertion of its power in East Asia has inspired the United States to tighten its links with allies like Japan, while proposing a Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty that, by excluding China, looked very much like part of a frantic policy of anti-Chinese containment. (KY’s note: both US presidential election candidates Clinton and Trump oppose TPP.) To the distress of policymakers in Washington, Brazil, India, South Africa and other countries have joined China to lay the foundations for new international institutions that the United States would not be able to dominate. Adding insult to injury, America’s own allies, Britain, Germany and France, disobeyed Washington’s request and joined the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
The standard of living in the United States will probably be higher than those in China and India for the rest of the century, if not beyond. But this is cold comfort. Even if only a fraction of the population of China or India enjoys American living standards, that elite minority could number in the hundreds of millions. And claims that America’s exceptionally innovative culture will ensure a continued technological lead is at odds with the insistence of Silicon Valley that the United States cannot continue to innovate without a constant stream of students and skilled workers who are the products of primary education in China and India, among other nations. At any rate, innovation as an element of geopolitical power is overrated. In many areas the United States was less innovative than Germany during the world wars, but prevailed nonetheless thanks to sheer demographic and industrial mass.
What about primacy as hegemony? During the Cold War, the United States acted as the hegemon of the American-led “Free World” alliance. To its allies and clients it acted as a military protector, a market for exports and provided the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Following the Cold War, optimistic policymakers of both parties hoped that America’s alliance hegemony could be translated into enduring American global hegemony. In the emerging multipolar world dominated by continent-states like China, India and the United States, along with various medium-sized powers, no nation will be able to play the role of a military, financial or commercial hegemon.
It may take time for a new system to replace the dollar as the global reserve currency. But America’s two other hegemonic functions are already under severe strain.
The world’s second-largest economy, which the United States already is when measured by purchasing power parity and will soon be when measured by market exchange rates, simply cannot function as a market of first resort for export-oriented countries, in the way that an older United States enabled the development of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Most of the growth of the global middle class in the future will take place in China, India and other parts of the non-Western world.
At the moment, the United States is determined to remain the military hegemon in four regions: East Asia, Europe, the Middle East and North America. But as China grows in wealth and power, the U.S. attempt to thwart its regional hegemony in East Asia may prove to be as doomed as would have been a British attempt to contain the United States in North America after 1900. If China and India successfully assert their own spheres of influence, after the model of America’s Monroe Doctrine, the United States may have no choice but to retreat from globalism.
In theory, the United States could augment its strength by maintaining the transatlantic alliance. Europeans might welcome U.S. aid in protecting them from dangers from the Middle East and North Africa. But they would be unlikely to join the United States as allies in a Sino-American Cold War. A defensive, neutralist Europe, a sort of giant Switzerland, with a foreign policy toward the Chinese, Indian and American titans dominated by commercial considerations, is a possible, perhaps a likely, outcome.
Confronted with projections of global power shifts, American triumphalists tend to put their hopes either in Chinese stagnation or collapse, or else in a miraculous rejuvenation of American wealth and power. But projections like the ones I have cited assume slower Chinese growth going forward.
Nor is there much the United States can do to boost its share of global GDP. The U.S. fertility rate is below replacement, and yet even admitting enough immigrants to maintain population stability may be difficult, given the public backlash against mass immigration. Because of low labor-force growth, American GDP growth will be slower than in the past and determined largely by the pace of productivity growth. American hawks who propose cuts in entitlements for the elderly to fund higher defense spending are living in a dream world. In a budgetary showdown between American retirees and the Pentagon, the Pentagon will lose.
The overall picture is clear, even though details may turn out to be wrong. By the middle of this century, most of the world’s industry and military potential are likely to be concentrated in four places: China, India, Europe and the United States. In the emerging polycentric world, no single superpower like the late-twentieth-century United States will exist to provide global security and to promote a single set of economic rules. A multipolar world is likely to be a more fragmented world of regional spheres of influence and shifting security alliances reinforced by strategic trade and investment deals. Even if new cold wars are averted, the peace among major countries is likely to be not warm friendship, but a wary cold peace.
The United States will continue to be one of the Big Three or Four economic powers, and one of the Big Two or Three military powers, as far as the eye can see. But it will have to adjust to the loss of its status as the world’s largest economy and the world’s only superpower. Robert Kagan has written that superpowers can’t retire. But they can be forced to share the stage.
This is the sixth in a series of essays on the future of American primacy. You can read the previous essay, “American Power in an Age of Disorder” by Barry Gewen, here.
Michael Lind is a fellow at New America, a contributing editor of the National Interest, and author of The American Way of Strategy.
Source: National Interest “Can America Share Its Superpower Status?”
Note: This is National Interest’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.