Navy Whistleblower Raised More Alleged Safety Violations at Aircraft Maintenance Facility Before Being FiredPosted: July 18, 2017
Safety concerns in military riding high after KC-130 crashed, killing 16 last week
BY: Susan Crabtree
July 17, 2017 10:19 am
A whistleblower who uncovered life-threatening fuel risks to Navy pilots and others was raising new safety complaints before managers fired him in early June.
Glenn Schwarz, a civilian aeronautical-engineering technician, says his civilian managers placed him in a highly technical job calibrating equipment used for testing weapons systems and equipment that support aircraft—a position for which he did not have the training or knowledge to perform. He also has asserted that the on-the-job training managers provided did not comply with Navy regulations.
“Glenn is unqualified, and thus not authorized by Navy regulation to conduct calibration activities,” his lawyer said in an email to an attorney for the Navy’s Fleet Readiness Center-East in Cherry Point, N.C., Schwarz’s employer. “On-the-job training is not going to correct that deficiency.”
Cheri Cannon, his attorney, said Schwarz’s placement in a job for which he was unqualified reflects a larger problem with workers lacking credentials in violation of Navy regulations at the Metrology and Calibration (METCAL) laboratory and across the Fleet Readiness Center-East (FRC-E).
“Glenn is one of several employees at the METCAL lab who apparently lack either the proper education, training, or experience to properly do the job and this is an accident waiting to happen because of it,” she said.
The lax training and qualification standards is part of a broader history of flouting of Navy safety standards at FRC-E, some of which Schwarz has already played a role in exposing, she said.
The Office of Special Counsel, an internal federal government watchdog, is investigating Schwarz’s firing as an act of reprisal. Another quasi-judicial government agency for federal employees, the Merit Systems Protection, imposed a temporary 45-day halt to Schwarz’s firing while the OSC investigates.
A spokesman for the FRC-E declined to comment on the agency’s reasons for firing Schwarz, citing privacy laws designed to protect personnel. The U.S. Navy’s Air System Command public affairs office did not return calls seeking comment.
Safety concerns are running high across U.S. military communities in recent days after a Marine Corps KC-130 crashed in rural Mississippi a week ago, killing 16 people aboard and spreading debris for miles. The Marine Corps has officially said only that the aircraft “experienced a mishap” but provided no details on whether it was related to maintenance problems or pilot-error.
The KC-130 was coming from the Marine Corps Station in Cherry Point, the same location of the FRC-E maintenance and refueling facility at issue in Schwarz’s initial substantiated safety disclosures.
In addition, the Air Force temporarily grounded an F-35 fighter wing in Arizona last week after five incidents in which pilots suffered from oxygen-deprivation problems. Navy officials in recent months have described a rising rate of “physiological episodes” of those affecting pilots who fly all models of the F-18 aircraft, which is often described as the backbone of naval aviation.
Navy officials have categorized the episodes into two general groups: Those related to “pilot breathing gas” and those caused by “unscheduled pressure changes” in the cabin. A team of Navy investigators have assessed 382 cases so far, determining that 130 involved some form of oxygen contamination and 114 involved a failure of the jet’s system that maintains cabin pressure.
It remains a mystery whether the aging fleet or maintenance problems—or a combination of both—are leading to the sharp uptick in oxygen-related problems for pilots.
John Cochran, a professor emeritus of aerospace engineering at Auburn University, said any decision by managers to disregard required qualifications for highly technical jobs such as fixing support systems troubles him.
Cochran has served as consultant and expert witness in the analysis and reconstruction of accidents involving more than 30 airplane and helicopter crashes, many of them military aircraft.
“The regulations are written for a purpose, of course, and the purpose is to maintain a certain level of safety,” he said. “And if you have violations of those—any one little violation—the wrong type of violation at the wrong time—could cause an accident.”
C-130 military cargo aircraft had problems in the late 1970s and 1980s in cases he worked on with throttle-cables breaking, and those caused accidents, he said. The cables, and other sensitive systems on the aircraft, require accurate servicing and maintenance to avoid calamities.
“I don’t know all the regulations as far as what the Navy has on the books, but the smallest thing can sometimes cause a major problem—that’s the bottom line for aircraft,” he said. “We’ve had some of these aircraft for a long time, and they’re very reliable in most cases. But if you don’t follow the regulations, then you’re risking a lot.”
Schwarz was fired June 8 for what his lawyer describes as “trumped up” attendance-procedure charges and other false allegations she said would not have been leveled if he were not a whistleblower whose complaints caused friction and new safety standards at the FRC-E facility.
A Navy Inspector General report in 2015 substantiated many of Schwarz’s complaints about the improper testing of aircraft fueling equipment and the jet fuel itself, as well as the improper disposal of thousands of pounds of jet fuel.
The IG found that fuel hoses and the gauges on fuel trucks had not been tested in years, creating a possibility that contaminants could enter the fuel and pass by aircraft filtering systems, leading to potentially life-threatening engine performance issues and the deadly fire risks on the ground.
That Navy IG report was sent to then-President Obama and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. The audit recommended more than a dozen steps to bring the FRC-E into compliance with Navy rules.
At the time of his initial fuel-safety complaints, Schwarz was responsible for administratively releasing aircraft for flight and ensuring all required maintenance and inspections were completed. After disagreements with his managers and legal action to try to mitigate what he says were threats of further reprisals, Schwarz agreed to accept a new aeronautical-engineering technician job in the hope of putting the issues behind him, his attorney said.
The settlement included a position description for a new job that Schwarz would accept that specified that his employers would continue to place him in an aeronautical engineering-technician job, according to his attorney. The new position’s description is classified as a “metrology-engineering technician.”
That job deals with the highly technical equipment calibration for which he is unqualified, according to Navy manuals his lawyer cited in a letter to the FRC-E’s attorney and Office of Special Counsel mediators.
According to Navy guidelines, known as “an instruction,” “all calibration processes utilize metrological measurement techniques. To ensure accurate and reliable technical expertise, it is necessary to employ high-caliber technicians and enhance their technical capability through additional training.”
The instruction goes on to say that civilian employees hired to perform calibration procedures and functions must have certain educational or training backgrounds, including a Bachelor of Science in engineering or physical science, completion of a METCAL apprentice training program of four years, an Associate of Science in physical science degree, vocational school or physical/mechanical background, or equivalent skills and four years of experience.
Specifically, the METCAL job description for his current role said applicants must have “extensive practical application experience in the field of metrology or calibration” including knowledge of all the “assigned platforms” relating to several aircraft and their “associated engines, test stands, peculiar/common support equipment and weapons systems, and operational plans to enable the incumbent to make technical decisions on problems and concerns.”
Additionally, the job requires an “ability to recognize anomalies and determine if they are due to equipment, experimental or other errors” and “takes [sic] action to make changes to equipment calibration procedures to resolve problems.”
“”Mr. Schwarz has none of these educational credentials, experiences or formal training,” Cannon said. “He is ill-equipped to meet the demands of the calibration lab, and using him is unauthorized.”
“He must be put through school in order to comply with the [Navy regulation],” she said. “Simply put, putting an untrained, unqualified person like Glenn in a position required by NAVAIR instructions to have certain training and education that he does not have, is a safety hazard which can easily be avoided.”
She also pointed out that placing Schwarz in the position exposes the FRC-E command “to some risk should something be missed or go awry with equipment Glenn is asked to work on.”
Source: Washington Free Beacon “Navy Whistleblower Raised More Alleged Safety Violations at Aircraft Maintenance Facility Before Being Fired”
Note: This is Washington Free Beacon’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
I am puzzled by Washington Free Beacon’s article on June 23 titled “Freighter Was On Autopilot When It Hit U.S. Destroyer: USS Fitzgerald did not detect container ship”
The writer says quite a lot to prove that the Philippines-flagged cargo ship ACX Crystal was on autopilot when the collision between it and USS Fitzgerald took place, but why the US destroyer failed to detect the coming large cargo ship and avoid the collision.
The article says that the US destroyer has advanced navigation radar and also uses a commercial radar system “to enhance the shipping traffic picture of ships in its vicinity”.
Navy ships operate radar systems to detect approaching ships or submarines. Lookouts posted on the bridge are responsible for detecting ships that pose a risk of collision.
Additionally, all commercial ships over 300 tons are required under international rules to operate AIS location data. AIS information from Crystal should have been monitored by sailors on the bridge of the Fitzgerald.
It is unbelievable that an advanced US warship could not have detected a large cargo ship with its advanced radars and sensors.
What if a terrorist fast boat carrying high explosive attacks the warship? The warship would certainly sink no matter how heroic its crew were.
A fast boat may be not easy to detect as it may be stealth and too small and fast to detect, but a large cargo ship cannot be stealth or too small or fast so that it is very easy to detect.
Even if all the advanced radars and sensors on the warship had malfunctioned, there must have been at least a crew member on duty on the bridge to find the large ship and have the warship steer away to avoid the collision.
It gives the impression that the cargo ship is perhaps on autopilot but the warship was on none-pilot with no one taking care of its navigation.
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on Washington Free Beacon’s article, full text of which can be viewed at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/freighter-autopilot-hit-us-destroyer/?utm_source=Freedom+Mail&utm_campaign=f420f813af-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_30&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b5e6e0e9ea-f420f813af-46069085.
February 22, 2017
By LT X
The age of the strike carrier is over. As the United States enters an era where the potential for modern great-power war is increasing dramatically in Eurasia, a return to the traditional roles of the aircraft carrier is required to maintain maritime access. Carrier-borne over-land strike warfare has not proved decisive in previous conflicts in heavily contested air defense environments, and will not prove so in the future. In the potential high-end conflicts of the twenty-first century, the likely utility of carrier-based land strike is largely non-existent. Thankfully, the traditional carrier aviation roles of maritime interdiction and fleet air defense remain highly valuable in wars against modern navies, but are precisely the roles, missions, and tactics sacrificed for sea based over-land strikes over the past sixty years. Regaining this capability will require a modest investment in existing and developing systems and capabilities and should be the force’s, the service’s and the nation’s highest objective in the coming years.
Aircraft Carriers in Over-Land Strike
American carrier airpower received its combat indoctrination in the Pacific War. However, pollution of the history of that campaign by naval aviation and airpower enthusiasts caused the lessons of that war to ossify over time. During Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s campaign aircraft carriers and their air wings almost exclusively provided maritime interdiction and fleet air defense. There are three major exceptions to this rule; Doolittle’s raid, the offloading of the Enterprise air group to Henderson Field during the Solomon Islands operation, and the strikes against the Japanese redoubts and the home islands late in the war. Additionally, carrier air forces provided strikes to Marine landings and naval aviation supported the Army landings of MacArthur’s campaign, most famously at Leyte. Admiral Kinkaid’s light carriers supported much of this effort, as well as Vice Admiral William F. Halsey’s and Raymond Spruance’s fast carrier task forces of Third and Fifth Fleets.
Doolittle’s raid, a strategic success due to its propaganda value, did not obtain any operational or theater-strategic gain, provided no notable hindrance to the Japanese war effort, and was conducted with US Army Air Corps (USAAC) B-25 Mitchell aircraft. Only the USAAC aircraft possessed the combination of ordnance load, endurance, and thrust to make the adventure over the Japanese home islands possible, even as a publicity stunt.
When the Enterprise disembarked her air group to Henderson Field, her aircraft provided valued support to the Marines fighting their way across Guadalcanal and to American naval forces fighting for sea control in Iron Bottom Sound. During the campaign, the major value of those aircraft remained air defense and anti-surface warfare. The Enterprise air group made combat air patrols, searched Iron Bottom Sound during daylight, and engaged any Japanese ships unfortunate enough to find themselves in range in daylight. The Enterprise air group’s combat air patrols made daylight resupply of Japanese Army units impossible, a sea control, anti-surface warfare capability. While the air group could not provide enough firepower accurately enough to dig the Japanese out of the jungle by themselves, it successfully isolated the battlespace to allow the Marines to do their work as it controlled the approaches to Iron Bottom Sound.
After Midway and the Solomon Islands campaigns, American carrier air power did begin to conduct some overland strike, mostly in the form of raids on enemy bases, but the fast carrier task forces remained focused on fleet air defense and anti-surface warfare. This alludes to the fact that, despite its ailing naval forces, Japan’s air and surface units still represented a potential threat to the American war after 1942. This was true as long as they possessed the capability to conduct a highly destructive strike against American fleets.
Leyte Gulf totally destroyed this capability and thereafter American carriers began wholehearted support of major fleet landings. However, in these endeavors they posted a mixed record, being unable to provide enough ordnance precisely enough to make the Marines’ tasks much easier as they tried to advance over hard volcanic rock on Iwo Jima and the difficult terrain and defense in depth on Okinawa. Indeed, in these campaigns, American carrier air power’s signature achievement proved the destruction of the Japanese super-battleship, not any air-to-ground ordnance delivery.
The history of the Second World War has been polluted by naval aviation, claiming the conflict as the age of the aircraft carrier. This stands almost no historical scrutiny. The campaign hung in the balance in the Solomons as much as Midway or Coral Sea, with no U.S. carriers available. Moreover, battleships proved highly useful throughout the war with their extensive anti-air armament and state-of-the-art radars providing close-in air defense for task forces. The Pacific War’s history is much more nuanced than naval aviation enthusiasts give credit for, and at its conclusion, not the carrier but the aircraft carrier task force proved to be the central weapon of war, with naval aviation posting meager results in ground support or strategic land strike.
What commonly became known as the “strike” aircraft carrier (CVA) was, in fact, the atomic carrier. In a memorandum as assistant Chief of Naval Operations for guided missiles, Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery opined that the U.S. Navy could strike more flexibly, as effectively, and at less cost than land-based, atomic-armed bombers requiring local bases to launch their fighter escorts. Gallery’s motivation was at least partially parochial. The newly-formed U.S. Air Force was, at the time, attempting to cultivate a monopoly on nuclear strike planning. In the era as the only nuclear superpower, it seemed nuclear delivery would prove the best option for continued longevity of the U.S. Navy’s fleet. In this effort, the Navy reconfigured attack carrier air wings to deliver Navy special weapons. This reconfiguration was the first time a carrier air wing was doctrinally tooled for ground attack and strategic strike, vice the sea control disciplines of fleet air defense and anti-surface warfare. Over time, this strike carrier became the norm. Rather than provide value to the fleet, misperceptions of the efficacy of land attack caused the platform’s gradual devolution from a system that provided capability to the task force to a platform that sucked capability from it. With its air wing largely servicing land targets, the strike carrier now required the very anti-surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air capabilities it used to augment, to allow more substantial (although increasingly less effective) overland raids.
This strike configuration premiered during the Korean War. The Peninsula lacked a sophisticated air defense or early-warning system and communist forces only contested air superiority in MiG Alley on the western Sino-Korean border. Therefore, naval and Marine aircraft operating off of carriers did produce notable results in ground support. However, given the limited nature of the conflict, the austere environment of the peninsula, and the technical lack of sophistication of Chinese and Korean forces, it is hard to determine the overall effect of carrier air power. At any rate, whatever the tactical, operational, or strategic limitations imposed, the conflict ended inconclusively, whatever naval aviation’s record.
Likewise, the utility of the attack aircraft carrier proved mixed over Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, the communist North enjoyed competing Chinese and Russian military (as well as diplomatic and political) support. The Soviets provided a totally linked and integrated air defense network around vital areas including Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor, the two most strategic areas. This air defense system proved too dense and advanced for American carrier-launched aircraft to reliably penetrate and deliver ordnance. Indeed, during Operation LINEBACKER II, only B-52Ds with their improved Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) packages, proved able to operate in the zones. This represented a failure of American carrier air power. If the multiple aircraft carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin could not reliably penetrate North Vietnamese air defenses, what chance did they have off the Kola Peninsula or the Baltic?
Despite an air defense network similar to that installed over Hanoi, U.S. Naval Aviation contributed, but did not prove decisive in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. While fixed-wing, fast moving aviation assets provided impressive combat support, it took US Air Force F-117 Nighthawks, cruise missiles, and Air Force delivered precision munitions to penetrate the Iraqi air defense screen. Naval air forces proved totally unprepared for the precision munitions revolution, lacking laser target designators on the A-6s and A-7s that still formed the mainstays of the fleet. Instead, most naval aviation delivered Mk 80 series unguided weapons instead of the Paveway series carried by a small but growing section of Air Force platforms, including the Nighthawk. This made them incapable of delivering ordnance to targets with high risk of collateral damage and precluded many targets in Iraqi population areas, limiting the force’s contributions to the campaign to tactical and some operational strikes.
In the Balkan wars and later in Iraq and Afghanistan, American naval aviation never again faced an integrated air defense system. High hard decks precluded the efficacy of man portable surface-to-air rounds and obsolete mobile systems made air defense suppression a forgone conclusion rather than an aspirational goal in the early 2000s. Naval aircraft, belatedly modernized to take full advantage of the precision munitions revolution, delivered substantial amounts of ordnance in these conflicts, complementing American land-based air power. However, the aircraft lacked on station time and payload, showcasing a service preference for multi-role fighter-bombers with limited range vice the ultra-long range fighter and attack aircraft required for intercept and long-range anti-surface warfare. However, confronted with a total lack of modern air defense systems, they, like the Air Force, reigned supreme.
Never in its history has American naval aviation confronted a state-of-the-art, integrated air defense system and provided effective, strategic ordnance. Hypothetically, at times during the Cold War, American strike-configured carriers might have done so, but an era of fiber-optically interlinked, multi-frequency, phased array air defense systems totally precludes such operations. Moreover, naval aviation assets lacked the range to strike strategic targets deep in mainland China and central Russia, limited to around 1,000nm inland.
Modern Aircraft Carrier Utilization in Great Power War
The utility of the STRIKE carrier in great power conflict is over. More accurately, as the previous section highlighted, it never really existed. American strike carriers throughout their history proved incapable of gaining and maintaining access to heavily defended areas and this trend will only grow more severe. China’s Great Wall of air defense on the northern Taiwan Strait will again preclude American carriers from gaining access to strategic areas in mainland China. Russia’s high-value areas are already well defended. China’s continued investment in air defense systems will cause this problem to continue to distribute throughout Asia. Further, a series of anti-access systems fielded by China, but also increasingly by Russia, are pushing U.S. carrier task forces out of range of present naval aircraft.
American planners are hoping, almost as a matter of faith, that an increase in the range of carrier-based aircraft would provide for continued access. This approach is wrong-headed. First, what land targets would such aircraft service? Perhaps Hainan Dao, or some rocks in the South or East China Sea, hardly a war-winning strategic strike. Second, how will these aircraft gain access in order to deliver the strike? American naval aircraft are too obsolete to deal with any but the most lightly defended of modern targets, and the F-35 will not markedly change this equation.
So let’s give up? Call it a day? Beef up Air Force appropriations? Not even close. American naval air power is the critical capability in the U.S. arsenal in the Western Pacific and the North Atlantic. Instead, force planners should recall why the U.S. built aircraft carriers in the first place, and where they last played a critical strategic role: in anti-surface warfare and fleet air defense. American carrier air power in the Pacific War hinged not on great strikes against the home islands, but rather on massing striking power against Japanese naval surface forces, Japanese air forces, and by protecting the fleet during operations and major landings. This is where naval aviation must again put its efforts.
Air wings at present are much better configured for low-risk ground attack than for operations against other navies. Air operations in the Pacific War required mass, exercising Halsey’s axiom that carrier air power increased at the exponent of the number of carriers engaged. Those operations encompassed large sorties, with hundreds of aircraft in major fleet actions. Over the past twenty-five years these skills have been lost. American carrier forces now exercise in single or dual carrier configurations. In Halsey and Spruance’s era, their fleets swelled into double digit large flattops, with myriad small deck escort carriers providing combat air patrols, anti-submarine forces, and landing support. Additionally, that war featured raids of hundreds of naval aircraft against enemy surface formations. Critics will claim that such mass is no longer required in the precision munitions era but such claims ignore that defense systems have also improved dramatically, making saturation the only sure way to put sophisticated, modern air defense ships out of action. To be clear, this author is not advocating a wholesale return to Nimitz’s fast carrier task force. However, the tactics, techniques, procedures, and training of American carrier air forces are out of touch with a modern, sea-control war, and a single U.S. CVN must be able to generate the mass and firepower necessary to fight in a modern, contested sea environment.
American naval aviation forces have not experienced platforms with the anti-air capabilities of ships as capable as the current generation of Chinese Navy Luyang hulls. U.S. tactics presently involving two or four aircraft sorties are totally inadequate for destroying an AEGIS-equivalent ship. To overwhelm a Chinese, or even an aging Russian surface formation, will likely require dozens of anti-ship cruise missiles. A single carrier must contain the capability to put such a ship (ideally many such ships) out of action, quickly. However, at present such a task requires the bulk of a modern air wing to generate the volume of fire required. This would likely also require a total re-arming of carrier magazines with a focus on sea control weapons and systems lest a CVN run itself out of anti-ship missiles in a few early engagements.
Moreover, distributed lethality requires a distribution of air power. Without fast-moving defensive counter-air formations operating with small surface action groups, American light forces will find themselves extremely vulnerable to attack. Modern surface combatant anti-air weapons range remains about 100nm. Modern air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles regularly feature twice that range and increasingly much greater. Without defensive counter-air formations attached to light surface forces, enemy aircraft will use the haven of range to mass firepower, overwhelming a formation’s air defenses while maintaining relative safety over the horizon. Allowing distributed light forces some measure of defensive counter-air capability will allow those formations to break up air attacks, ideally precluding saturation of U.S. platforms, offset electronic emissions away from the formation to make enemy targeting of the group more difficult, and therefore dramatically increase survivability.
The United States certainly has the capability to maintain the primacy of its carriers, especially in the maritime-dominated Western Pacific. The U.S. must use its large-decks to maximum potential. This includes American large-deck amphibious shipping, in the form of LHDs and LHAs. Such ships’ amphibious capability will likely not add much to the initial phases of great power war when sea control and air superiority are contested. Importantly, small carriers proved highly useful in both Atlantic and Pacific theaters of the Second World War, providing long-range air defenses for convoys and robust anti-submarine capability outside of the range of land-based air power. In the 1960s, the U.S. began using Essex-class carries in an anti-submarine configuration (CVS vice the strike carrier CVA). In fact, USS Intrepid, a CVS-configured carrier, conducted strikes into northern Vietnam off Yankee Station, when it became apparent that PRC submarines did not pose a serious threat to the American Carrier Operating Areas (CVOAs). Likewise, the British prioritized antisubmarine work and limited air defense capability in their Invincible-class light carriers which featured heavily in the Falkland Islands War. American Wasp– and America-class ships, loaded with F-35s, SH-60s, and MV-22s, can provide the same – an air defense, anti-surface, and anti-submarine screen. Operating in the vicinity of a Surface Action Group Operating Area (SAGOA), the large-decks could provide on-station defensive counter-air, visually identify unknown contacts, and augment the ASW aircraft from a SAG to increase the group’s submarine localization and anti-surface strike capacity.
American naval forces are only a fraction of the way to recognizing the capabilities the MV-22 provides. At present, the U.S. Navy has only tested MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft in a Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) capacity, the CMV-22. However, the aircraft retains substantial potential in anti-submarine warfare and airborne early warning, among other uses. U.S. Navy carrier task forces until the early 2000s incorporated the S-3 Viking aircraft, a high-subsonic anti-submarine jet. These aircraft retired in the early 2000s due to lack of fleet interest in anti-submarine warfare. In the heavily contested North Atlantic or Western Pacific, against foes with modern undersea forces, such a capability once again is required. The MV-22 would expand this capability. While slower, it provides potential marked improvements in range, low-altitude handling, on station time, and sensor payload. Such aircraft would provide a step-increase in surface-force ASW capability, potentially loaded with dipping sonars, sonobouys, and a large number of Mk 54 torpedoes. Further, mounting a high-performance radar on such an aircraft would allow some measure of airborne early warning to small surface units. Combined with point-to-point data links, these aircraft could provide over-the-horizon situational awareness while limiting surface force’s radar transmissions. This would complete the capability of the light-carrier air group described above and substantially increase the lethality of the small satellite surface groups orbiting the aviation ship. Additionally, due to their vertical takeoff and landing capability, the MV-22 could potentially lily pad off smaller ships, particularly the huge flight decks of Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) increasing their time aloft forward. While heat management proved frustrating early in the aircraft’s tenure, this issue has been fixed with temporary heat shields which could be staged onboard. The MV-22 provides a cheap method to reconstitute integrated ASW capability and provide survivable, high-speed warning and reconnaissance.
U.S. Naval Aviation must train for saturation raids, publicly. Saturation attacks are a lost art, and likely aviation forces have much to learn. Such attacks will require heavy coordination between aircraft and squadrons, flexing intellectual muscles left dormant since at least the end of the Cold War. Is a saturation attack down one bearing better, with inbound missiles exceeding the target’s sensor capacity in a single direction, or better from multiple vectors or compass points, overloading close-in defenses? Such questions require at-sea testing. Additionally, such training is an important signal to U.S. maritime adversaries. The fact that U.S. naval aircraft are prepared to destroy high-end platforms, and have the capabilities to do so, emphasizes U.S. resolve in an era and in areas where such capability is in question.
Ultimately, the F-35 has a huge role to play in a reconfigured carrier air wing. Without it, the U.S. Navy will have no answer to the range of proliferating fifth generation fighters it would face in the Barents, Baltic, or China Seas. Joint Strike Fighter’s use is not bombing the Senkakus or trying to break into mainland China’s air defense network. Instead, only the F-35, to include or perhaps even feature the F-35B flown off LHDs and LHAs, can provide the protection of U.S. light forces and the carrier itself with an aircraft capable enough to survive in a modern air war. Forward distribution of the F-35 in support of U.S. light forces will provide a critical capability to those ships operating at the far reaches of U.S. sea control when they confront the J-20 and Su-35, armed with large numbers of long-range anti-ship missiles.
Finally, naval air must expand the capabilities of the legacy and Super Hornet variants of the FA-18 with software upgrades and improved radars and sensors, to help electronics warfare and battlespace awareness functions on the aging airframes to keep pace with F-35. The F-35’s stealth will not be decisive in future conflicts. The frequency agility of modern air defense sensors is just too good. Only the survivability and lethality of the weapons it carries will keep these airframes lethal into the future. Hornets must maintain their capability in the areas of fleet air defense and anti-surface warfare by a refresh of the aircraft’s sensors and systems. This is not to preclude F-35. Without the Joint Strike Fighter, the only fifth generation fighter available, American carrier air forces will be obsolescent by the end of the decade. However, the Hornets will also have to operate in the same environments, and need to be configured to do so.
American naval forces are not a tool for strategic strikes. Instead, they should be used operationally, to provide strategic affects. A great power war will require progressive sea control, as attrition dominates seagoing forces on both sides. At some point, one side or the other will alone maintain the capability to operate in the contested theater. Naval aviation should use its striking capability to advance this attrition-based operational concept as quickly as possible by massing its striking power quickly against targets. Only by eliminating enemy platforms and blinding adversary ISR assets will U.S. forces survive.
In order to do this effectively, U.S. naval air forces must support distributed forces. The can do so by coordinating with large-deck amphibious shipping to distribute their own lethality, providing defensive counter-air coverage and situational awareness to surface action groups operating on the front line of American naval power. This will free U.S. carrier aviation for anti-surface warfare and local air superiority.
The MV-22 is the great unrecognized platform with almost limitless potential for operational flexibility. With increased sensor loads and weapons, the tiltrotor can deliver long-endurance, low-altitude ASW and high-altitude situational awareness if properly configured. Such sea control capabilities would pay huge dividends in future naval combat.
At its base, this work is about naval aviation in an era of contested sea control. This era will require airborne forces to re-examine the assumptions of the past six decades of naval aviation, retooling the air wing for maritime strike. This will require radically different magazine selections on the carrier, likely some new weapons, including higher-capability anti-ship weapons, and a total retooling of air wing certification and training regimens. Aircraft carriers have a huge role in future wars, but the retooling of their aircraft and their operational concepts must begin now.
LT X is an officer in the United States Navy. Feedback should be directed to email@example.com and will be forwarded to the author.
Featured Image: An aerial view of various aircraft lining the flight decks of the aircraft carrier USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62), right, and USS MIDWAY (CV-41) moored beside each other in the background at Naval Station Pearl Harbor (Wikimedia Commons)
Source: CIMSEC “The Age of the Strike Carrier is Over”
Note: This is CIMSEC’s article I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the article’s views.
In its report “All Navy F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, Growlers grounded after incident injuring aircrew”, Navy Times says that as a result, US aircraft carriers have no warplanes to attack or defend themselves.
The following is the full text of the report:
All Navy F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, Growlers grounded after incident injuring aircrew
By: Andrew Tilghman , December 17, 2016
The Navy temporarily grounded all F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growlers Friday after an aircrew was injured and a Growler damaged in an undisclosed incident Friday at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Navy officials said.
The aircrew of an E/A-18G jet assigned to Electronic Attack Squadron 132 was injured in an “on-deck emergency” about 11 a.m. Friday, according to a statement from Naval Air Forces.
Naval Air Forces has temporarily suspended flight operations for all F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growlers as a safety precaution since they share common aircraft systems, according to the Navy statement.
The operational pause will allow both Naval Air Systems Command and engineers from Boeing, which manufactures both aircraft, time to investigate the incident, Navy officials said.
Cmdr. Jeannie Groeneveld, a spokeswoman for Naval Air Forces, told Navy Times Saturday there were two aircrew involved, the pilot and electronic warfare officer. They were both admitted to the hospital.
The ground emergency involved the jet’s canopy, and an investigation is underway to determine the cause of the incident, said Groeneveld.
Navy officials say commanders can make exceptions to the fleets’ grounding on a case-by case basis for operational needs.
Note: This is Navy Times’ report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.
Reuters says in its report “China to return seized U.S. drone, says Washington ‘hyping up’ incident” that the incident of China having seized a US unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has been resolved smoothly as China promised to return the UUV to the US in the talks between China and the US.
China is able to detect and track small and silent UUV. It is certainly able to detect US nuclear submarines.
The incident proves China’s capabilities to detect and track US underwater equipment including submarines. The catch of the UUV is a significant show of Chinese navy’s muscle and tell US military that its dream to attack China with UUVs or submarines has been utterly broken.
Comment by Chan Kai Yee on Reuters’ report, full text of which can be viewed at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-drone-idUSKBN14526J.
By Josh Rogin September 15
Senior executives from a major U.S. defense contractor toured China last month as part of their search for a foreign company to build a dry dock for U.S. Navy ships, with the help of the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The trip raised eyebrows both inside the Pentagon and among experts who don’t believe a Chinese company should be involved in U.S. military-related projects.
The company, Ingalls Shipbuilding, is a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries, which advertises itself as “America’s largest military shipbuilding company” and has built more U.S. Navy ships than any other military shipbuilder. Ingalls is based in Mississippi. The problem is, it needs a new dry dock to build ships there and says there are no American companies that can do it. So Ingalls is looking abroad for help.
Last month, senior Ingalls executives traveled to China for two weeks to visit several different ports. They also met with officials at the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, a meeting facilitated by a very powerful Mississippi lawmaker.
“The staff of Sen. Thad Cochran (R-MS), the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, has requested that Consulate Shanghai meet with a Mississippi constituent company Ingalls Shipbuilding,” wrote an official from the State Department’s legislative affairs bureau in a July 19 email I obtained. “The constituent is looking for a new Chinese vendor to build a new drydock for their shipbuilding company. They would like advice from the Consulate to walk them through how to do business in China.”
Ingalls executives met with U.S. officials in Shanghai, including Cameron Werker, the principal commercial officer at the consulate. In a follow-up email, Werker said Ingalls executives were planning to visit seven ports in China. The company has already conducted technical evaluations of proposals, and “China is the leading candidate,” Werker wrote. The other candidates are South Korea and Japan.
Ingalls’s only client is the U.S. Navy, according to Werker. He wrote that the plan is to build ships to about 50,000 tons in Mississippi and then float them out to the dry dock for adding another 20,000 tons of exterior work. The dock would then be used for “launch and retrieve.”
After the Ingalls executives left China, the defense liaison officer in Shanghai, Steve Angel, alerted the Pentagon, the Navy and the U.S. Embassy in Beijing about the trip.
“Ingalls Shipbuilding was here looking at Chinese shipbuilding companies to build a dry dock for USN ship construction,” Angel wrote. “Lobbied for by a U.S. Senator (Cochran). Not sure what Big Navy’s or OSD’s awareness are, but wanted to flag this for awareness.”
Larry Ferguson, China country director for the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s policy shop, responded to Angel’s email: “I think it’s fair to say we’ll want to do some fact finding.”
The Pentagon declined to comment about whether it has concerns about a Chinese shipbuilding company potentially building a dry dock that will then be used to build and maintain U.S. Navy ships.
“As many other shipyards in America, including those that also build Navy ships, have done in the last decade when needing to replace a large dry dock, Ingalls Shipbuilding is looking across the world market for a solution,” said Bill Glenn, a spokesman for Ingalls. “Since no decision has been made, it is premature to discuss this effort further.”
Chris Gallegos, a spokesman for Cochran, told me that the senator’s office didn’t actually lobby for Ingalls to get meetings with U.S. officials in China, but only forwarded a request for a point of contact at the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai from Ingalls to the State Department.
As for whether there is a security concern about having a Chinese company help build U.S. Navy ships, Gallegos said, “Senator Cochran expects all security precautions to be in place to protect U.S. national security.”
According to its public filings, Huntington Ingalls spent $4.8 million on lobbying in 2015. One of Huntington Ingalls’s in-house lobbyists, Carolyn Apostolou, spent 26 years as a professional staffer on the Senate Appropriations Committee before joining Huntington Ingalls in 2013, according to the Center for Responsive Politics’ Open Secrets project. Gallegos said Ingalls employees have also supported Cochran financially.
“Ingalls is the single largest private employer in Mississippi. Given Senator Cochran’s strong record of support for industry in Mississippi, I suspect many Ingalls employees have supported his campaigns,” he said.
Some Asia experts believe that there’s a real security risk in having a Chinese company build a dry dock for U.S. Navy ships because all large Chinese companies have deep ties to the Chinese government.
“Any time you have an entity like that working on U.S. military systems, common sense tells you there’s likely a security risk,” said Michael Auslin, Asia scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. “We know that there are connections, we know there is influence, we know there is government assistance. The Chinese government will have the plans.”
The Chinese government could use the project to implant surreptitious recording devices or other surveillance equipment near where sensitive U.S. Navy operations are ongoing, he said. U.S. intelligence agencies suspect that China uses projects of its largest telecom company, Huawei, as a means of spying on foreign countries.
Moreover, the Ingalls project would be a boon to the Chinese defense industry at the expense of the defense industry of U.S. allies, Auslin said. The money is essentially coming from the U.S. taxpayer because the U.S. government is Ingalls’s only client, he said.
“Wouldn’t it be better to go with an ally like Japan or South Korea?” Auslin said. “In an environment like this, you are basically subsidizing the Chinese defense sector. Is that something we want to do?”
It’s a shame the United States can’t handle 21st-century shipbuilding with its own domestic industry. But if U.S. defense contractors have to go abroad, they might want to think twice before subcontracting to America’s biggest naval competitor. It’s either a security risk or an economic subsidy that could better benefit an allied country. Either way, it’s a bad idea.
Josh Rogin is a columnist for the Global Opinions section of The Washington Post. He writes about foreign policy and national security. Follow @joshrogin
Source: Washington Post “Why is the Navy’s largest shipbuilder looking for a subcontractor in China?”
Note: This is Washington Post’s report I post here for readers’ information. It does not mean that I agree or disagree with the report’ views.